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BEYOND PARITY: SECTION 1983 AND THE STATE
COURTS
Susan N. Herman*
State court is the new frontier of civil rights litigation. As
the Supreme Court has been cutting back on the substance of
federal constitutional rights' and the availability of federal court
relief,2 prospective plaintiffs have been turning to the state
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Barnard College, A.B., 1968; New York
University School of Law, J.D., 1974. I am grateful to Margaret Berger, Maryellen Ful-
lerton, Marsha Garrison, and Joel Gora, Professors of Law, Brooklyn Law School and
Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts, to Joan Bratkowsky, Kerry Brennan and David Woll for
their research assistance, and to Brooklyn Law School for the generous support of its
research stipend program.
' See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (negligent excessive use of force on
prisoner does not state claim under eighth amendment); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983) (relaxing standards for determining whether search warrant based on informant's
tip satisfies fourth amendment probable cause requirement); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981) (no fourteenth amendment procedural due process claim exists if the state
courts afford an adequate remedy for negligent deprivation of property); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (extending Parratt, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), to intentional dep-
rivations of property); Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (no
first amendment right to disseminate leaflets in private shopping center).
2 See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (fed-
eral injunctive relief unavailable in section 1983 action if based on pendent state law
claim); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (federal injunctive relief unavail-
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courts for vindication of their rights. These federal court refu-
gees rely on state constitutional claims if they need a haven
from restrictive federal constitutional doctrine,' but, more and
more frequently, they simply bring their federal claims to state
court under the aegis of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.1
able against future police practices for plaintiffs who could not show a likelihood they
themselves would suffer from those practices); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (plaintiffs challenging a state taxation system on constitu-
tional grounds must take their claims to state court if adequate state court remedies
exist); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal injunctive relief generally unavaila-
ble to enjoin state criminal proceedings).
These proliferating restrictions arise largely because of the Court's discomfort with
the bulk and nature of section 1983 litigation. See Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights - Will The Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 20-29 (1985); Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8, 62-65 (1984);
Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes The Federal Courts Out
Of The Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 841, 850-58 (1977);
Rudenstine, Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonationalism and
the Debate Over Political Structure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449, 452-54 (1986); Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REV. 61,
76-79 (1984); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980); Zagrans,
"Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L.
REV. 499, 503 & n.15 (1985).
3 The fact that the states may be more generous in interpreting their own constitu-
tional provisions than the Supreme Court has been in interpreting parallel federal con-
stitutional provisions, even if the language of the provisions is the same, has spawned a
nationwide cottage industry in state constitutional case law and scholarship. For good
discussions of the issues presented in such litigation, see Symposium: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959 (1985); see also Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Collins &
Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitu-
tional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986); Galie, The Other Su-
preme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV.
731 (1982); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Developments in the Law, The Interpreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 and sources cited at 1328-29
nn.15-22 & 1334 n.20 (1982).
Backlash has developed in some states. For example, a recent amendment to the
Florida Constitution provides: "This right [against unlawful searches and seizures] shall
be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12 (1968,
amended 1982). See also Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of
Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223 (1984).
" Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
(Vol. 54: 1057
BEYOND PARITY
The rapid proliferation of section 1983 actions brought in
state rather than federal court is easy to understand. Although
state courts might not be required to entertain section 1983 ac-
tions,5 they do have concurrent jurisdiction to do so,6 and most
states have agreed to exercise this concurrent jurisdiction.
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
See Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MAY L. REv. 725 (1981) (recognizing the significance of the phenomenon of state court
section 1983 actions) and Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Proce-
dural Review, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 381 (1984) (same). Professor Steinglass estimates that
in two decades, reported state appellate section 1983 decisions have increased from a
handful to almost 200 per year. Id. at 435. The same author's SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN
THE STATE COURTS (1988) [hereinafter S. STEINGLASS] is a useful treatise for state court
practitioners and judges contending with section 1983 actions.
Most of the discussion in this Article would apply equally to section 1983's less fre-
quently litigated companion statutes, especially sections 1981 and 1982 of title 42 of the
United States Code.
' The question was expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Martinez v. Califor-
nia, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
For arguments that state courts should be required to hear section 1983 actions, see
Gordon & Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1145, 1156-70 (1984); Neuborne, supra note 4, at 753-59; Note, Section 1983 in
State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414, 420-28
(1985) [hereinafter Note, State Taxation]; Note, State Enforcement of Federally Cre-
ated Rights, 73 HAxv. L. REV. 1551, 1551-56 (1960) [hereinafter Note, State
Enforcement].
' See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S.
496, 506-07 (1982); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980); Martinez, 444 U.S. at
283 n.7.
7 See Steinglass, supra note 4, at 559-60 (appendix E for a list of relevant state
court cases).
Issues do still arise as to whether states may carve out exceptions to their accept-
ance of section 1983 litigation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide one such
issue during the 1984 Term, in the case of Spencer v. South Carolina, 281 S.C. 496, 316
S.E.2d 386 (1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 82 (1985). The South Carolina courts held that it is
permissible for a state court to refuse to hear a claim under section 1983 when an ade-
quate state law remedy existed and when the sole purpose of invoking section 1983 was
to justify the allowance of counsel fees. 281 S.C. at 496, 316 S.E.2d at 389. This opinion
was affirmed by an equally divided Court. 471 U.S. at 82.
Similar issues continue to arise in various contexts. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Coughlin,
128 A.D.2d 995, 513 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 602, 512
N.E.2d 550, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1024 (1987) (refusing to hear damages claim in state court
section 1983 action against state corrections officer because state law committed such
claims to a remedy in the Court of Claims). See Steinglass, note 4, at 382-89.
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Plaintiffs' attorneys now frequently add a section 1983 claim to
what would otherwise be a state tort action s - adding a fourth
amendment based police misconduct claim to a battery action
when police brutality is alleged, or a due process claim to a
wrongful discharge action when a government employee has
been fired - because in this way they can consolidate related
state and federal claims in one action,9 because state court may
be more familiar or convenient to the attorney than federal
court,10 and because a victory on a section 1983 claim brings
with it the coveted right to collect attorney's fees."
A federal statute in state court is an awkward guest. Two
different sets of governing rules compete, each with a strong ar-
gument for its own applicability. Should a state court hearing a
federal section 1983 claim seek to mimic the procedures a fed-
eral court would have followed in hearing the same claim, or
should it follow the procedures it would have followed (or possi-
bly will be following) in hearing the state law analogue of the
claim? It is clear that the state courts must follow the "sub-
' The substantial overlap between section 1983 and state tort actions has been well
noted. See Whitman, supra note 2. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Su-
preme Court recognized this correspondence, declaring that section 1983 should be char-
acterized as a personal injury action for the purpose of choosing the applicable state
statute of limitations. See text accompanying notes 100-01, 105-06 infra.
9 It may not always be possible to consolidate related state and federal claims in one
proceeding in federal court because of restrictions, see note 2 supra, disabling the federal
court from providing requested injunctive relief or even damages. In state court, the re-
strictions of the eleventh amendment, article IH, and federal court prudential doctrines
are inapplicable. See text accompanying notes 237-44 infra.
10 Familiarity and convenience can be powerful motivating factors. In one survey,
attorneys in ten jurisdictions were asked whether, jurisdiction being equally available,
they would prefer to litigate civil actions in state or federal court. Of 252 respondents,
193 expressed a preference for state court and 34 for federal court. (The remaining re-
spondents expressed no preference.) The principal reasons given for preferring state
court were quicker disposition of cases, familiarity, and convenience. This preference was
despite the fact that most respondents thought federal judges more competent and fed-
eral procedure superior. See O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal
and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
801, 816-19 (1981) (appendix A).
n See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (giving the court discretionary power to award rea-
sonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party, other than the United States, as part of
trial costs); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (In enacting section 1988, Congress
intended to make attorney's fees available in state court section 1983 actions.).
For a fuller discussion of factors influencing choice of forum in section 1983 actions,
see Steinglass, supra note 4, at 413-24; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1105 (1977) (arguing for the superiority of federal court as a forum for civil rights
litigation).
[Vol. 54: 1057
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stance" of section 198312 and, at least in some circumstances,
may follow their own "procedure,' but long experience in di-
versity cases and in other areas of concurrent jurisdiction"4
teaches that this distinction is more a restatement of the prob-
lem than a resolution of it. Are strict pleading rules procedural?
Are allocations of burdens of proof or the relative responsibili-
ties of judge and jury procedural?
Other issues, less familiar from the past, also arise. May a
state court apply a state notice of claim statute which would not
have been applied in a parallel federal court section 1983 action
in that jurisdiction?'5 May a state court, following its usual
court rules, refuse a section 1983 plaintiff a jury trial in a cate-
gory of case in which a jury trial would have been available in a
parallel federal court proceeding?'" On the other hand, may a
state court apply an unusually generous standing doctrine and
hear the section 1983 claim of a plaintiff the federal courts
would have turned away?' 7 Does it matter whether the federal
court would have denied the plaintiff standing on the basis of
12 Once the Supreme Court has decided, for example, that a municipality is a "per-
son" within the meaning of section 1983 and therefore may be sued as a defendant, see
Monell v. City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the state courts may not declare that, as far
as they are concerned, municipalities are not "persons." The Supreme Court has held
that state law may neither contract nor expand the substance of section 1983. See Moor
v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (application of California state law providing
for vicarious liability of county in federal court section 1983 action would be unwar-
ranted expansion of section 1983 without congressional authorization). For a suggestion
that the states might be permitted to expand but not contract the substance of section
1983, see text accompanying notes 252-54 infra.
The Supreme Court's definition of the substance of section 1983 has been generous.
See text accompanying notes 90-106 infra.
,3 Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2306 (1988). ("No one disputes the general and
unassailable proposition relied upon by the Wisconsin Supreme Court below that States
may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts.") See text
accompanying notes 289-302 infra for some examples of such "procedures" (Section III.
B of text).
" See text accompanying notes 184-231 infra.
" The Supreme Court has answered this question in the negative. See text accom-
panying notes 37-48 infra.
" See note 302 infra.
17 See, e.g., Langford v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 21, 37 n.6, 729 P.2d 822, 833 n.6,
233 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398 n.6 (1987) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (California
standing requirements "less stringent" than those imposed by federal law); South Bur-
lington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 337, 456 A.2d 390,
483 (1983) (state standing doctrine "'much more liberal'" than that applied in federal
court) (quoting Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realities Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275
A.2d 433 (1971)).
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prudential concerns,18 or because of the restrictions of article
III, 19 in which case the state court's decision on a matter of fed-
eral law would be unreviewable by the Supreme Court?
20
These questions and many others like them are inevitable.
They are also inevitably difficult for two reasons. First, the an-
swers to these questions depend on the intent of Congress"I in
an area in which Congress has been particularly inscrutable.22
Second, even if Congress wished to create a new statute to ad-
dress these questions, it is not easy to resolve the conflicting pol-
icies at stake or to draw clear lines in this area. The Supreme
Court, working in the absence of articulated congressional in-
tent, has provided answers to several questions about what col-
lateral law23 state courts may or must use in section 1983 ac-
tions, but has not provided a cogent theoretical basis for
answering the questions remaining. Thus, the brunt of the prob-
lem of deciding what procedures and principles to apply to state
court section 1983 actions is being borne by state court judges
and litigators, who have been discovering the truth of Hart's ob-
servation, in a similar context, that "[p]eople repeatedly sub-
jected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of di-
rections, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could
not fail in the end to react as the dogs did."
2
'
This Article will explore means of resolving these inconsis-
tencies. The first section will discuss the current state of the law
- relevant Supreme Court case law, and what we know of con-
's See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (restrictions on plaintiffs' standing
in exclusionary zoning challenge not attributed to Article III).
19 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-10 (1983) (standing re-
striction attributed to Article I case or controversy requirement).
20 See text accompanying notes 255-63 infra for a discussion of this problem.
21 As in the context of federal diversity litigation, what is sometimes characterized
as a "choice" between federal and state law is, because of the supremacy clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, not truly a matter of choice at all. See Westen & Lehman, Is There Life
for Erie After the Death of Diuersity?, 78 MICH. L. RFv. 311, 316 (1980). The state courts
must apply federal law to the extent that Congress intends for them to do so. Although
the limits of Congress's power to impose federal law on the state courts have never been
tested, the FELA cases, see text accompanying notes 184-214 infra, assume that this
power is an expansive one.
2 The relevant statues are, for the most part, either silent or thoroughly ambiguous
on the key questions concerning concurrent jurisdiction and the role of the state courts.
See text accompanying notes 62-142 infra.
23 By collateral law, I mean state or federal rules, statutes, or practices extrinsic to
section 1983 itself, and therefore possibly not "substantive" federal law.
24 Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489
(1954).
[Vol. 54: 1057
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gressional intent and the Supreme Court's possibly distorted
view of congressional intent. Section II will suggest what the law
should be, analyzing the factors both Congress and the Supreme
Court should consider in deriving standards to govern these
choices of law. Part H then discusses application of these prin-
ciples in four instances in which state and federal collateral law
might differ: (1) when a state's justiciability principles are less
restrictive than federal justiciability principles (more plaintiff-
oriented, as when a state's standing doctrine is more generous
than that prevailing in federal court); (2) when a state's jus-
ticiability principles are more restrictive than federal, as when a
state would employ an exhaustion of administrative remedies re-
quirement in certain types of cases; (3) when a state's procedure
is more favorable to plaintiffs than federal (when a state pro-
vides attractive attachment procedures or does not require the
posting of a bond as a prerequisite to injunctive relief, for exam-
ple); and (4) when a state's procedure is less favorable (when
state law would not provide for a jury trial, for example).
I have no easy answers, for these are not easy issues. In fact,
many of my conclusions render these choice of law decisions
more difficult than they might otherwise be. If congressional in-
tent were clear, if precedent addressed analogous issues, if some
overriding principle - like a need for uniformity of decision -
applied, decisions about choice of federal or state collateral law
would be simplified. But I conclude that congressional intent
provides little guidance on these issues (including some the
Court has already decided), that precedents in other presumably
analogous areas are not sufficiently analogous to lend their an-
swers, that the need for uniformity is not a categorical impera-
tive in this area, given the balkanized nature of section 1983 liti-
gation, and that there is no substitute for making decisions on
individual issues by balancing the relative federal and state in-
terests involved.
These conclusions would lead to disparity - among state
courts, and even between federal and state courts in the same
jurisdiction - but I will argue that allowing state and federal
procedures for handling section 1983 cases to evolve differently
will serve the goals of section 1983 if plaintiffs are afforded a
true choice between the federal and state forum.
1989]
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Supreme Court and State Court Section 1983 Actions
The Supreme Court has decided three significant cases on
collateral law in state court section 1983 actions. 5 In each of
these three cases, the Court used the supremacy clause to pro-
hibit the states from following relevant state collateral law, bas-
ing its holding on an interpretation of congressional intent. Al-
though I have no disagreement with the results of these
particular cases, I think these opinions and others on related
topics 26 overread and perhaps misread congressional intent,
mostly on the issue of the need for uniform results in section
1983 litigation.
In the first case, Martinez v. California,7 the state court
applied a state statute that immunized a parole officer from lia-
bility, thereby defeating the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.28 The
Supreme Court simply announced that the state statute should
not have been followed because the existence of an immunity
defense in a section 1983 action is a federal question.29 The com-
mon law of immunities the Supreme Court has been applying in
section 1983 cases 0 was deemed intrinsic to the statute itself,
and, therefore, accompanied the statute to state court.
Martinez prohibited use of a state statute unfavorable to
plaintiffs, while the next case compelled a state court entertain-
ing a section 1983 action to employ a federal statute favorable to
plaintiffs - in this case the provision of 42 U.S.C. section 1988
25 Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980);
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 227 (1980). In Smith v. State, 428 Mich. 540, 410
N.W.2d 749 (1987), cert. granted sub nom., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 108 S.
Ct. 1466 (1988), the Court will be called upon to decide whether the state is a "person"
within the meaning of section 1983, a question that does not arise in federal court section
1983 actions because of the restrictions of the eleventh amendment.
26 See text accompanying notes 90-109 infra.
27 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
28 Plaintiffs, survivors of a girl killed by a parolee, claimed that state parole officials
had denied them due process of law by participating in an allegedly reckless parole re-
lease decision which led to the girl's death. Id. at 279.
2, Id. at 284. The Court went on to find no constitutional violation on the theory
that state actors had not caused deprivation of the girl's life, and, therefore, decided that
the issue of whether parole officers should be considered entitled to immunity from suit
under federal law need not be reached. Id. at 284-85.
10 Id. See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra for discussion of the Court's treat-
ment of the issue of common-law immunities under section 1983.
[Vol. 54: 1057
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allowing attorney's fees to a prevailing party. 1 In Maine v.
Thiboutot,32 the Supreme Court found that Congress intended
the attorney's fees provision to apply to state as well as federal
court section 1983 actions.33 It took no more than three
sentences for the Court to reach this conclusion. Citing one rep-
resentative's reference to state court actions during the floor de-
bate,34 and a senate report's description of attorney's fees as "an
integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain" compliance
with section 1983,35 the Court then concluded: "[i]t follows from
this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provi-
sion is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought
in state or federal court. '36
If these cases provided scant explanation for the Court's re-
sults, the next case, Felder v. Casey,37 compensated by providing
too much. Plaintiff Felder's state court section 1983 action al-
leged that he had been subjected to a racially motivated arrest
and beating by Milwaukee police officers. The action was dis-
missed on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with a
state notice of claim statute.38 The statute at issue provided that
no suit may be brought in Wisconsin state court against a state
or local governmental entity or officer unless the plaintiff in the
action has (1) within 120 days of the alleged injury notified de-
fendant of the circumstances, the amount of the claim, and the
plaintiff's intention to hold defendant liable,3 (2) waited 120
" 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to en-
force a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title ... the Court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasona-
ble attorney's fee as part of the costs."
32 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
33 Id. at 11.
" Representative Drinan described the purpose of section 1988 as being to "author-
ize the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in actions brought in State or Federal
Courts." 122 CONG. REC. 35,122 (1976). See 448 U.S. at 11.
11 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5913. See 448 U.S. at 11.
36 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court also provided some hasty policy rationales in a foot-
note: first, if attorney's fees were available only in federal court, federalism interests
would not be served because plaintiffs would be dissuaded from bringing their actions in
state court; and second, the unavailability of attorney's fees in state court would be a
financial disincentive for plaintiffs unable to bring section 1983 actions in federal court.
Id. at 11 n.12.
37 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
38 Id. at 2314.
" Alternatively, the plaintiff could satisfy the statute by demonstrating that the
1989]
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days after such notification to allow defendant an opportunity to
decide whether to settle the claim, and (3) brought suit within
six months of receiving notice that the defendant disallowed the
claim.40 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had upheld the applica-
tion of the statute, reasoning that although Congress may set the
framework for section 1983 actions, the states should remain
free to prescribe the procedures under which such claims may be
litigated.4 '
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the notice of
claim statute was preempted. The rationales the Court provided,
some implicit and some explicit, are set forth roughly in order of
their appearance in the opinion: (1) the statute conflicts in pur-
pose and effect with the remedial objectives of section 1983;42 (2)
application of the notice of claim statute in state court will "fre-
quently and predictably produce different outcomes in section
1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in
state or federal court,"43 whereas Congress desires uniform adju-
dication of section 1983 actions within each jurisdiction;44 (3)
the notice of claim provision discriminates against federal
defendant had received actual notice. Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1987).
Plaintiff Felder claimed that the actual notice provision was satisfied in his case because
his neighbors had lodged complaints with the police, and a local alderman had written a
letter to the chief of police complaining about this incident. 108 S. Ct. at 2306. The
Wisconsin court held that these communications did not satisfy the actual notice provi-
sion because the facts giving rise to plaintiff's alleged injuries were not provided, and the
plaintiff's intent to hold defendant liable was not expressed. Id. The Supreme Court
several times commented grimly that the facts in this case showed that the actual notice
provision was hard to satisfy. Id. at 2314.
40 Wis. STAT. § 893.80(1).
41 Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 628, 408 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct.
2302 (1988). Among the legitimate state interests the court believed this statute to serve
were protecting against stale or fraudulent claims, facilitating prompt settlement of valid
claims, and identifying and correcting inappropriate conduct by governmental employees
and officials. 139 Wis. 2d at 624, 626, 408 N.W.2d at 24, 26.
42 108 S. Ct. at 2307. The Court analogized this statute to the immunity statute in
Martinez.
'3 Id. This is because under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, the
federal court will borrow state law in section 1983 actions only if federal law is "defi-
cient," see text accompanying notes 85-90 infra. The federal courts generally do not see
the lack of a federal notice of claim provision as a deficiency, and so do not apply state
provisions. See 108 S. Ct. at 2307-08; Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1509 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1984) and cases cited therein; but see Cardo v. Lakeland Cent. School Dist.,
592 F. Supp. 765, 772-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff's untimely notice of claim unduly
burdened state agency).
44 108 S. Ct. at 2307.
[Vol. 54: 1057
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claims;45 (4) the provision is "outcome-determinative" and states
may not apply outcome-determinative law when entertaining
substantive federal rights in their courts;46 (5) the provision con-
ditions a federal right of recovery; (6) the provision is not other-
wise a neutral and uniformly applicable rule; (7) the provision
operates as an exhaustion requirement, which Congress intended
to prohibit in state as in federal court section 1983 cases;47 (8)
the states may not impose "unnecessary burdens upon rights of
recovery," citing and presumably analogizing to the principal ex-
ample of concurrent jurisdiction cases the Supreme Court has
considered in the past - the federal Employers' Liability Acts4 8
(FELA) cases; 49 and (9) the state courts should afford the same
deference to federal law in litigating federal claims under section
1983 as a federal court would to state law in a diversity case (a
reverse Erie concept).50
" Although the notice of claim provision applied to all suits against state and local
officials and did not single out federal claims, it was likely to have a particularly strong
impact on section 1983 actions. The view that the states might not be permitted to adopt
procedures that affect state as well as federal claims, but that have a particularly heavy
impact on federal claims, can be viewed as an expansive reading of the antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine. Under this doctrine states are not permitted to refuse to hear federal
claims if they would hear comparable state claims, see text accompanying notes 247-48
infra for a fuller discussion of the antidiscrimination doctrine.
A 108 S. Ct. at 2313.
'v Id. at 2314. In so holding, over a vigorous dissent, the Supreme Court resolved a
controversy begun in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). In Patsy, the Court
held that no exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement may be imposed in fed-
eral court section 1983 actions. Some state courts believed that this holding should not
extend to state court section 1983 actions, see, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 408
N.W.2d 19 (1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 383
N.W.2d 54, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App.
707, 323 S.E.2d 381 (1984), review denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 392 (1985), while
others thought Patsy should apply to state court also, see, e.g., Handschuh v. Superior
Ct., 212 Cal. Rptr. 296, 166 Cal. App. 3d 41 (Ct. App. 1985); Laurel Park, Inc. v. Pac, 194
Conn. 677, 485 A.2d 1272 (1984); Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
Crawford, 59 Md. App. 276, 475 A.2d 494, 501 (1984), aff'd, 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079
(1986); Beverly Bank v. Board of Review, 117 Ill. App. 3d 656, 661, 453 N.E.2d 96, 99(1983); Beitel v. Board of School Comm'rs, 419 So. 2d 242, 245 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982);
Stratos v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 439 N.E.2d 778 (1982); Maddox v.
Clackamas Cty. School Dist., 293 Ore. 27, 31, 643 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1982); Lloyd v. Bor-
ough of Stone Harbor, 179 N.J. Super. 496, 432 A.2d 572 (1981). The arguments seemed
so balanced that the author of Note, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Section
1983 Actions Brought in State Court, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1037 (1984) took no position on
what the outcome should be.
'8 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
" See text accompanying notes 184-214 infra.
o This reverse Erie notion will be discussed at text accompanying notes 215-31
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The Court did not discuss the state interests underlying the
notice of claim provision, simply stating, "Under the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution, '[t]he relative importance to
the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict
with a valid federal law .... ' "51 Also rejected by the Court was
the state's proffered concept, derived from a classic article by
Henry Hart," that federal law should "take the state courts as it
finds them. ' '53 This "equitable federalism" argument, said the
Court, has no place in supremacy clause analysis.54
This fistful of rationales replaces the Court's breezy asser-
tions in Martinez and Thiboutot that it was simply following
the will of Congress. Congressional intent on the issue in Felder
is, as the dissent points out, not at all clear.5 5 Certainly the no-
tice of claim provision conflicts with the remedial scheme Con-
gress wished to make available by enacting section 1983. But
does that mean that Congress would have intended for the state
courts to be barred from applying such a provision? This is a
different question, and Hart's answer to this question is that
Congress should not dictate procedure for the states to use in
adjudicating federal rights as long as it has ensured that a fair
federal forum is available. 6 Under Hart's theory, the state
court's concurrent jurisdiction is supplementary, and if the state
court procedures are not as favorable to plaintiffs as federal pro-
cedures, the solution is for plaintiffs to exercise the choice of
forum concurrent jurisdiction allows them by bringing their
claims to federal court.
The alternative view has been best stated by Burt
Neuborne, who argues for procedural parity between state and
federal courts in section 1983 actions.5 Neuborne takes the posi-
tion that federal collateral law on issues including pleading rules
and class actions should follow section 1983 into state court
whenever the purposes of section 1983 would be served.55 The
infra.
51 108 S. Ct. at 2306 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
52 Hart, supra note 24.
53 Id. at 508.
54 108 S. Ct. at 2313.
51 Id. at 2318-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51 Hart, supra note 24, at 509 & 514. Hart would make an exception for state rules
so rigorous as to nullify the federal rights asserted. Id. at 508.
57 Neuborne, supra note 4, at 786.
58 See id. Professor Neuborne describes the question posed more generally as
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purposes ascribed to Congress are defined as, first, the ultimate
purpose of deterring state officials from violating civil rights, and
second, the instrumental purpose of enhancing the ability of
civil rights plaintiffs to litigate and prevail on their claims.59 The
latter purpose will consistently be served by any procedure at-
tractive to plaintiffs; the former purpose requires closer analysis.
Neuborne's thesis rests in part on an analogy to the Supreme
Court's FELA cases and in part on the reverse Erie concept en-
dorsed by the Court in Felder, both of which he combines to
construct a set of rules to apply in all cross-forum choice of law
situations."0
Neither position is very attractive if taken to an extreme.
The Court has already rejected a broad view of Hart's thesis by
holding that the state courts may, in some circumstances, be
compelled to forego their usual modes of procedure. It is equally
unlikely that the Court will require the state courts to adopt
every federal procedure - including federal discovery practices,
class action rules, and federal rules of evidence - that might
benefit a civil rights plaintiff. Felder rejects an extreme version
of Hart's theory, but does not necessarily endorse an extreme or
even moderate version of Neuborne's. In steering a course be-
tween the two extremes in future cases, the Court will be evalu-
ating and balancing a number of factors. Assigning a greater
value to the state's interest in following its own procedure will
lead to a model closer to Hart's, while assigning a greater value
to intrastate uniformity will favor Neuborne's views. A desire to
promote the goals of section 1983 might lead in either direction.
In Part II, I will discuss these factors, how they are served or
disserved by the different paradigms, and the validity of the
FELA and Erie analogies. But first, because congressional intent
is the key to supremacy clause questions, I will begin where the
Court in Felder began, and discuss what we know of Congress's
views on these issues. The Supreme Court in Felder is continu-
ing a trend toward minimizing the role of state law, maximizing
the creation of federal common law, and exalting the desirability
of uniformity between state and federal courts in adjudication of
whether a collateral rule is likely to alter the general allocation of risks reflected in sec-
tion 1983 itself. Id. at 773 & 775.
" See id. at 769, 771 & 780.
"' See id. at 766-76.
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federal rights. The relevant legislation and history show this po-
sition to be more a construct than an interpretation of Con-
gress's views.
B. Congress, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and Section 1983
Congress has not explicitly addressed the issue of the role of
the state courts in section 1983 litigation. However, several
sources provide some basis for judging Congress's views on the
interests section 1983 was intended to further, the role of state
law, and the significance of uniformity: the history of section
1983 itself and its presumptive grant of concurrent jurisdiction
to the state courts; 42 U.S.C. section 1988, which provides for
choice of law in federal court section 1983 actions; and 28 U.S.C.
section 1441, which permits civil rights defendants to remove
section 1983 actions to federal court. The legislative history of
section 1983 supports an inference that the 42nd Congress not
only wished to promote civil rights, but also would have wished
to encourage the state courts to litigate their own civil rights dis-
putes.61 Section 1988, at least as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, shows a Congress not unwilling to allow diversity in sec-
tion 1983 litigation and expressly advocating the use of some
state law in adjudication of this federal right. The removal stat-
ute, surprisingly and probably accidentally, enhances the role of
the federal forum by allowing civil rights defendants to undercut
plaintiffs' choice of forum when a plaintiff has made the choice
Congress did not expect, and remitting to the federal courts
cases that both the plaintiff and the state court wish the state
court to hear.
1. The Purposes of Section 1983 and Concurrent
Jurisdiction
It is accepted gospel that Congress's main aims in enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1871,62 the predecessor of section 1983
and its companions, were three:63 (1) to override certain kinds of
61 This was the Supreme Court's assumption in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11
n.12 (1980) and in Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2314 (1988).
" See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). For convenience, I will simply refer to Congress's progression of statutes in this
area as "section 1983."
" See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961).
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state laws when those laws prevented the vindication of civil
rights; '4 (2) to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate,
as where blacks were incompetent to testify against white men
who committed crimes against them;65 and (3) to provide a fed-
eral remedy where the state remedy, although adequate in the-
ory, was not available in practice.6 The third aim has been char-
acterized by the Supreme Court as the broadest and the most
important of Congress's goals.6
The question of whether Congress intended federal jus-
ticiability principles and procedures to apply to state court sec-
tion 1983 litigation is complicated by the fact that most mem-
bers of Congress apparently did not "intend" the state courts to
entertain section 1983 actions at all, at least not in the usual
sense of the word. When the 42nd Congress created section 1983
and its companion civil rights statutes, state court was part of
the problem rather than the solution. As the fourteenth amend-
ment already provided sufficient ammunition for dealing with
restrictive state laws,6s it does seem fair to say that the chief
impetus for section 1983 was to provide a federal court forum
and federal remedies for those unable to vindicate their federal
civil rights in state court.69 Among the obstacles to state court
relief cited in the legislative debates were the biases of state
prosecutors, juries, and even judges.70 Federal court, where
64 Id. The view was expressed during the debates that this aim was irrelevant be-
cause no such state laws existed. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 268-69
(1871) (statement of Mr. Sloss).
' See id. at 345; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
66 Id. at 174.
, The Court stated: "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights - to pro-
tect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that ac-
tion be executive, legislative or judicial.'" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
(citation omitted).
" See Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 194-98 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"6 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (Congress assigned the
paramount role in section 1983 litigation to the federal courts). In fact, some of the bit-
terest criticism of the proposed civil rights statutes sprang from the concern of various
members of Congress that state courts were being stripped of the ability to hear claims
concerning the conduct of state officials. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 86
(1871) (Rep. Storm complaining that fourteenth amendment litigation was being given to
federal courts and taken away from the state courts).
" See id. at App. 78 (statement of Rep. Perry) ("Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see
not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand
and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices."); id. at 334 (statement of Rep.
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judges enjoyed life tenure and, hence, better insulation from po-
litical pressure, and where discriminatory state statutes and pro-
cedures could be sidestepped, provided an opportunity to over-
come these obstacles.
Because the Supreme Court operates on a presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction,' state court jurisdiction over section
1983 actions derives from what Congress did not say.72 The leg-
islative history of section 1983 bears only several passing refer-
ences to the awareness of particular congressmen that the state
courts might be able to entertain section 1983 actions,73 and no
Hoar) (deploring the unavailability of state court for actual enforcement of the laws); id.
at 505 (statement of Sen. Pratt) (criticizing state enforcement of criminal laws against
blacks and union sympathizers); id. at App. 277 (statement of Rep. Porter) ("loyal men
cannot obtain justice in the courts").
"1 "[W]here 'an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without speci-
fying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if
not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court.'"
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (quoting Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
391 (1947); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876)). For a criticism of the general
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction and a proposed set of criteria for deciding when
there should be concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of action, see Redish &
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311
(1976); see also Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Pro-
posals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 207 (concurrent jurisdiction
should be imposed only when Congress has been explicit); Neuborne, supra note 4, at
758 (questioning presumption of concurrent jurisdiction if jurisdiction is then considered
to be obligatory).
7'2 The predecessor statute to section 1983, Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S. § 1983), provided for exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal courts (proceedings to be prosecuted in "the several district or circuit courts
of the United States"). The fact that this language was dropped when section 1983 was
enacted has been taken by some to mean that Congress must have intended the state
courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, see Note, The Enforceability and Proper Im-
plementation of § 1983 and the Attorney's Fees Awards Act in State Courts, 20 ARiz. L.
REv. 743, 747-51 (1978). However, the changes of language accompanying this recodifica-
tion were apparently so haphazard that it is unwise to draw such inferences. See
Neuborne, supra note 4, at 749 n.90.
" Only a few members of Congress referred to the possibility of state court litiga-
tion at all, and usually with some other point in mind. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 578, 694-95 (1871) (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (arguing that federal jurisdic-
tion was proper regardless of whether the state courts could hear civil rights cases); id. at
514 (statement of Rep. Poland) (alluding to the problem of dual sovereignty); see also id.
at 216 (statement of Sen. Thurman); id. at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar); id. at 514
(statement of Rep. Farnworth). Representative Bingham was one of the very few who
even seemed to consider that a state court action could be based on the federal Constitu-
tion, no less a federal statute, id. at App. 85 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
Even a century later, when Congress was debating whether or not to enact the attor-
ney's fees provision of section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, there was very
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discussion of why or how section 1983 actions were to be treated
in state court.
There are many compelling reasons for assuming that Con-
gress, had it considered the issue, would have decided to allow,
indeed to encourage, state court litigation of section 1983 ac-
tions. One common justification for conferring exclusive federal
jurisdiction is a desire for nationwide uniformity of result, 4 a
goal inapposite in section 1983 litigation where the issues in-
volved concern the intrastate conduct of state and local offi-
cials.75 Permitting concurrent jurisdiction provides for greater
availability of relief in civil rights actions and, thus, generally
promotes the purposes underlying section 1983. Section 1983
was created to provide a forum for those who could not obtain
relief from their state courts. If the state courts are in fact avail-
able, and even preferable to a civil rights plaintiff, there is no
reason why that plaintiff should be denied the opportunity to
bring such an action in state court, or the state court denied the
opportunity to hear it.
This result also promotes interests of comity and federal-
ism. Because section 1983 provides a cause of action against
state officials alleged to have deprived individuals of their fed-
eral civil rights, federal court adjudication of section 1983 claims
is frequently seen as potentially or actually intrusive upon the
states' power. Federal judges and their critics alike have often
felt uncomfortable about the prospect of federal courts sitting in
judgment on state officials or implementing decrees compelling
state officials to take or refrain from certain actions. 6 It was the
little discussion of the impact of such a provision on the states, or even acknowledgment
that the states would be affected. Representative Drinan, who merely commented that
the provision would apply in state court, see note 34 supra, was a rare exception.
7' Examples of exclusive jurisdiction include 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (bankruptcy proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (patent and
copyright cases); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335-36 (1948) (fines, penalties, forfeitures or seizures
under laws of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982) (crimes against the United
States). See generally Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private
Civil Actions, 70 HkRv. L. REv. 509, 511 (1957). In all of these instances, there is some
need for nationwide uniformity.
7' See text accompanying notes 154-81 infra for a discussion of the significance of
uniformity in federal civil rights actions.
76 One district judge hearing a case challenging conditions at the Indiana State
Prison plaintively remarked, "This Judge has indicated from the beginning of this case
to the present time, a complete and utter distaste for having to cross that Rubicon which
separates the federal government from the state government and enter into the morass
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experience of federal judges intimately involved in the day-to-
day operations of state institutions, such as prisons and hospi-
tals, that led the current Supreme Court to fashion doctrines
curtailing federal court intervention." Rightly or wrongly, the
Supreme Court has been very sensitive to the urgings of comity
and federalism in decisions cutting back the scope of federal
court involvement with state officials' civil rights violations, 8
and Congress has acceded. 9
These same concerns favor encouraging the state courts to
police their own state's errant officials if they will do so.80 There
is no comity or federalism problem if a state court finds a state
official guilty of a civil rights violation, or if it enforces a detailed
decree concerning the operation of a state prison or hospital.
The federal courts would be liberated from part of what many
view as a burdensome caseload, while the state courts would ac-
cept responsibility as guardians of the federal Constitution.81
of the day to day operation of the prison." Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 442
(N.D. Ind. 1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom., Wellman v. Faulkner, 715
F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).
For general discussion of the problem of federal court intervention into the opera-
tion of state institutions, see ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS, A FRAME-
WORK FOR STUDYING THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL-
ISM 13-22, 46-49 (1986) (a summary of the problems involved and proposals for a study
to assess the extent and impact of federal court intervention); Kaufman, The Anatomy
of Decisionmaking, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1984) (another federal judge's view of the
tensions and responsibilities in federal court litigation concerning state institutions);
Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 967-71 (1978)
(discussion of reasons underlying federal courts' relative lack of inhibition regarding in-
junctive relief in the context of state institutional litigation).
7 Dramatic limitations on relief arising out of institutional litigation include Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (limitation on federal
injunctive relief in case involving state mental hospital); and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981) (restrictive definition of fourteenth amendment due process claim in case in-
volving state prison).
78 See Rudenstine, supra note 2, at 474-79.
71 Congress has not overruled these restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of the
civil rights statutes.
80 By suggesting that the state courts should be encouraged to exercise their concur-
rent jurisdiction over section 1983 actions, I do not intend to endorse the restrictions the
Supreme Court has imposed on federal court litigation. I am not suggesting, as the Court
sometimes seems to, that the state courts should be the only forum available for this
litigation, but simply that they should be an available, and perhaps even a preferred,
forum.
81 See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WK &
MARY L. REV. 605, 624, 627-29 (1981) (state courts must be afforded an appreciation of
their role in adjudicating constitutional claims); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
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Encouraging state court civil rights litigation also serves the
important function of allowing more efficient litigation of civil
rights cases. The substantial overlap of section 1983 actions and
state tort actions has already been noted,s2 as has the fact that a
plaintiff who wishes to consolidate state and federal claims aris-
ing out of a single incident may only be able to do so in state
court.8 3 In light of the ever increasing number of restrictions on
the availability of federal relief, encouraging plaintiffs to litigate
in state court may be the only way to avoid duplicative
litigation. 4
Given all of these rationales for concurrent jurisdiction
-comity, efficiency of adjudication, plaintiff's choice of forum,
and expansion of remedies for civil rights violation - and the
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362
(1953) (state courts as the ultimate guarantors of federal constitutional rights).
At least one member of Congress believed that after the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
enacted, "the tumbling and tottering states [would] spring up and resume the long-ne-
glected administration of law in their own courts, giving, as they ought, themselves,
equal protection to all." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Coburn).
82 See note 8 supra.
83 See note 9 supra.
84 As one example, take a prisoner's claim for good time credit. Because a request
for injunctive relief is considered a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement, see
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), such a claim may not be brought under section
1983, but must be brought under the habeas corpus statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2254
(1982), and is therefore subject to the requirement that state court remedies be ex-
hausted. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-98. If a prisoner wishes to allege that he was subject to
an unconstitutionally conducted prison disciplinary proceeding at which his punishment
was deprivation of good time credit, he may wish damages for the violation of his consti-
tutional rights, as well as injunctive relief. While the claim for injunctive relief may not
be raised in federal court until it has been submitted to the state courts under Preiser,
the claim for damages is a proper section 1983 claim and may be raised in state or fed-
eral court. Raising both claims in state court might result in the damages claim being
collaterally estopped in a later federal court proceeding, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980). Therefore, the Supreme Court invites dual litigation in state and federal court
for plaintiffs who do not wish to relinquish the opportunity to have the federal court rule
on both claims, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974). This simultaneous
litigation then poses a new complex of problems connected with the order of proceeding
and the collateral estoppel consequences of different circumstances. See, e.g., Davidson
v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1986) (damages claim raised in federal court after case
was litigated in state court was not res judicata where damages were unavailable in the
state court action).
One way to avoid these problems is to trust the state courts with the entire package
of claims. Another solution is for Congress to address some of the holes and anomalies
the Court has created in federal court civil rights litigation and make the federal courts a
more fully available forum.
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fact that Congress only created a federal remedy to address what
it saw as the states' abdication of the responsibility to entertain
civil rights litigation, it seems clear that the state courts should
be encouraged to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction as much
as possible.
2. 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 and Choice of Law
Although not mentioning the state courts, Congress pro-
vided a set of instructions to govern the borrowing of state law
for civil rights actions brought in federal court. s5 Because the
provisions of section 1988 are significant, little-known, and pro-
foundly mysterious, they deserve to be set out in text:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL
RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons
in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
85 Section 1988 probably was intended to apply only in federal court. Section 1988
begins with the words: "The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts by the provision of this Title ... shall be exercised and enforced in con-
formity with the laws of the United States ...... 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (emphasis added). Of
course, since Congress had not explicitly conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the state
courts, one might reason that the lack of reference to state courts should not be regarded
as conclusive, and that any instructions issued to the federal courts in conjunction with
section 1983 cases should also be presumed concurrent.
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the Court applied section
1988 to a state court civil rights action, although without discussing its reasons for doing
so. Subsequent cases take a more literal and conservative approach to section 1988, as
recommended by Justice Harlan in his dissent in that case, see id. at 256. See note 88
infra.
Professor Steinglass assumes that Sullivan is still good law and that section 1988
therefore does apply in state court. See S. SmEINGLASS, supra note 4, at 489. See also
Walker v. Maruffi, 105 N.M. 763, 737 P.2d 544 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M.
707, 736 P.2d 985 (1987). The wording of section 1988, requiring the court to apply fed-
eral law except where it is "deficient" or "not adapted" makes little sense in the context
of state court. Professor Steinglass recognizes this in explaining that the state court's
inquiry into deficiency should be "necessarily narrower" than a federal court's because
much suitable federal law will exist but not apply in state court. Steinglass, supra note 4,
at 489. The only provision of section 1988 that makes sense in the state court context is
the inconsistency clause, which is superfluous, since the supremacy clause would prohibit
the state courts from applying any law, whether federal or state, inconsistent with sec-
tion 1983.
For these reasons, I conclude that Sullivan, which has been effectively overruled in
other respects, and which never seemed to recognize that applying section 1988 to the
state courts represented a decision, is not a reliable basis for finding section 1988 appli-
cable to the state courts. Accord Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1181 (1986).
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shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal case is held, so far as
the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in
the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. .... 8.
The few commentaries on this provision demonstrate conclu-
sively that no one knows what it means. The language is ba-
roque, and the legislative history of little help.87
The Supreme Court first interpreted section 1988 as author-
izing a court to choose between state and federal law, depending
on which best served the goals of section 1983.88 More recently,
however, the Court has interpreted section 1988 as establishing a
three-step inquiry:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as
such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights stat-
utes] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake
the second step by considering application of state "common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum
06 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
s7 One commentator, Theodore Eisenberg, argued that the statute is so bizarre that
it cannot possibly mean what it says and therefore must mean something altogether dif-
ferent. He proposed that section 1988 be deemed irrelevant to section 1983 actions and
applicable only in cases brought under state law and removed to federal court. See Ei-
senberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1980) (a thorough analysis and reductio ad absurdum of the
statute); see also Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light
on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 604-11 (1985) (on the ambiguity of the legisla-
tive history).
ss Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1962), involving claims under sec-
tions 1981 and 1982, interpreted section 1988 to permit a state court to choose between
state damages law and federal common law on damages, and to adopt whichever would
better serve the goals of the civil rights statutes. Id. at 240. Justice Harlan, in dissent,
took issue with the view that a choice is involved, interpreting section 1988 as establish-
ing a preference for federal law where it exists, and dictating the use of state law where it
does not. Id. at 256-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Current law reflects Harlan's view. See,
for example, Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), which required a federal court
to borrow state survivorship law less favorable to plaintiff than existing federal common
law. The Robertson dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and White,
argued for a return to the Sullivan rule and a freer choice between federal and state law.
Id. at 596-600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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state. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest:
courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States."8 '
Under this approach, state law could play a very significant role
in section 1983 litigation for it would govern whenever federal
law is "deficient" (so long as the state law were not itself incon-
sistent with federal law or policy). One might then infer that
Congress was not particularly concerned with nationwide uni-
formity of collateral law in section 1983 adjudication, even in
federal court, and that Congress was willing for the states to
play a significant role in creating collateral law for section
1983.90
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted section 1988
in ways that minimize the impact of state law, possibly more
than Congress would have intended, in order to serve the goal of
uniformity. These interpretations include a relatively narrow
definition of what constitutes a "deficiency" in federal law. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the common law existing at the
time of enactment of the Civil Rights Act should be deemed part
of section 1983, on the theory that Congress was aware of such
common law and did not disown it.91 Thus, federal law is not
"deficient" if common law predating the enactment of section
1983 existed.2 For example, in Martinez, the Court might have
11 Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984).
90 This is the view of one commentator who sees the statute as Congress's compro-
mise between the interests of federalism and promotion of civil rights, and urges greater
use of state law in section 1983 litigation. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congres-
sionally-Mandated Approach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REv. 665,
668, 692-712, 733 (1986).
Professor Kreimer, on the other hand, reads section 1988 differently. Finding it sur-
prising that a Congress suspicious of state law would have commanded extensive use of
state law in section 1983 actions, he proposes that the reference in section 1988 to "the
common law" be construed as referring not to the common law of the states, but to
federal common law, thereby authorizing the federal courts to create federal common law
in civil rights cases. Kreimer, supra note 87, at 615-16, 618-28. See note 102 infra.
91 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (If Congress had in-
tended to displace the common law of immunities prevalent in 1871, Congress would
have done so explicitly.).
92 Here again, the early Sullivan case had taken a different view. The majority
seemed to assume that federal law was "deficient" on the issue raised - the measure of
compensatory damages in civil rights actions - because Congress had not provided any
specific law on damages, and that it was, therefore, necessary to look to state law. Sulli-
van, 396 U.S. at 240. The law of damages is now considered intrinsic to section 1983. See
text accompanying notes 97-98 infra.
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taken the position that federal law is deficient on the issue of
immunity defenses because section 1983 itself does not speak to
the issue of immunities,9 3 and then, under section 1988, looked
to applicable state law (so long as that law was not inconsistent
with the purposes of section 1983)."' But because common-law
immunities are deemed to have survived the passage of section
1983, the Court does not refer to state law to determine when a
defendant may claim immunity.9 5 Instead, the Court has created
an entire federal common law of immunities, including a great
deal of case law on novel issues, which is deemed to be part of
the substance of section 1983.96 The Court has also created a
common law of damages 97 that it construes as integral to section
1983, rather than looking to state damages laws. 8
" See Coleman, supra note 90, at 723-26.
94 In Martinez, the Court presumably would have found the state immunity statute
to be inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983, as it precluded suit against the state
officials involved. The Court then, under section 1988, would have arrived by a different
route at the necessity of inventing federal common law to replace the burdensome state
law. See Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 520 n.82 (questioning what law does apply if state
law is considered and then rejected under section 1988). Under this approach, it would
be clear that the Court's substitute for state law could be derived from modern policies,
and not tied to the law of 1871. However, although the Court uses the common law in
existence in 1871 as an excuse to ignore the section 1988 reference to state law, the Court
has not been shy about modernizing the federal common law to be applied. See Kreimer,
supra note 87, at 607-11, for a discussion of the appropriate role of the common law of
1871 in section 1983 litigation.
95 In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326, 334 (1983), Justice Stevens described the
question of witnesses' immunity as one of "statutory construction" of section 1983.
0' See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (judicial immunity); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24
(1980) (conspirators' immunity); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719
(1980) (legislative immunity); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980)
(municipal immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (judicial immu-
nity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (same); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555 (1978) (prison officials' immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(prosecutorial immunity); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (hospital adminis-
trators' immunity); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school officials' immunity);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (various state officials' immunity); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial and police officials' immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislative immunity).
" See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages); City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (punitive damages unavailable against munici-
pality); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (nominal damages).
" As Sullivan had suggested, see note 88 supra, not imposing a blanket federal rule
would give the states the opportunity to be more generous than federal law requires. See
Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988), in which a state was prohib-
ited from giving an FELA plaintiff the advantage of a more profitable state law on dam-
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While federal law clearly is deficient in not providing a stat-
ute of limitations for section 1983 cases, 99 the Court, in Wilson
v. Garcia,100 found that the characterization of section 1983 for
purposes of choosing a statute of limitations is also a matter of
federal law.101 The Court chose to characterize section 1983 as
most closely resembling a personal injury claim, so although the
state legislatures do choose the length of the limitations period,
state common law plays no role in selecting a statute of
limitations.
Expanding the scope of the substance of section 1983 avoids
the use of much state law in federal court section 1983 actions
despite Congress's evident willingness in section 1988 to contem-
plate use of state law. 02 Why does the Court find this result de-
ages because the law of damages governing FELA claims was deemed to be exclusively
federal. See text accompanying notes 102-06 infra.
99 By way of contrast, Congress has provided statutes of limitations for such federal
actions as antitrust actions under 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982), and FELA actions, 45 U.S.C.
§ 56.
100 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
101 As was the case in Martinez and Thiboutot, see text accompanying notes 27-36
supra, the Court portrayed its decision as a simple matter of statutory interpretation. Id.
at 278-79.
102 Professor Kreimer, interpreting section 1988 as invoking federal rather than
state common law, suggests that the Court should create federal common law to govern
civil rights litigation except as to issues governed by state statutes (and constitutions,
presumably). See Kreimer, supra note 87, at 630-32. This approach, he argues, is at least
as consistent with the history of section 1988 as any other, and provides the virtue of
allowing the courts to create new law to meet new situations and to provide uniformity
of approach. His compromise does give the federal courts some basis for deciding when
to use state law, and when not, and harmonizes the Court's federalizing approach to
issues like immunities and damages with its attempt to follow state law on issues like
statutes of limitations. However, like all compromises, this one has an element of arbi-
trariness. What reason could there be for Congress to have concluded that state statutes
but not state common law should apply in federal civil rights actions? Cf. Hart, supra
note 24, at 512 (describing the significance of the Erie case as inhering in the federal
courts' attempt to respect the state's division of authority between its courts and its
legislature).
The idea that statutory law may in some instances be less likely to disadvantage
civil rights plaintiffs than state common law seems to be reflected in the Court's decision
in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), to tie section 1983 to the statutes of limitations
for personal injury. A state legislature is unlikely to reduce its personal injury statute of
limitations unreasonably, because much more than section 1983 litigation would be af-
fected. A court making a choice in a particular case, unlike the legislature, has no politi-
cal check to restrain such a decision and might be more likely to discriminate against
civil rights plaintiffs. But again, the Court can use the inconsistency provision of section
1988 to overcome such discrimination, whether by case or by statute.
I think the Court's different approach to issues like immunities and damages, on the
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sirable? If the Court were to use section 1988 more generously
and apply state law more often instead of finding or inventing
federal common law then deemed to be part of section 1983, the
state courts and legislatures would have the power to control
federal civil rights litigation by controlling their own law. This
might create a problem if the states had or created procedures
eviscerating civil rights actions. But section 1988 already deals
with that potential problem by providing that state law may be
rejected if it is inconsistent with the policies of section 1983. The
Court's approach, therefore, provides no more protection against
hostile state law.
At the same time, it precludes the possibility of a state ap-
plying more generous law. If a state has a damages rule that
would be more generous to civil rights plaintiffs, not only would
the federal court be foreclosed from selecting that rule, but the
state court would not be permitted to use the rule in a section
1983 action either, because federal damages law is deemed to be
part of section 1983 itself.103 The Court has already held in an
FELA case that the state may not afford a federal claim plaintiff
the benefit of a more generous state law on damages. 04 Simi-
larly, while the Court's decision in Wilson protects against un-
suitably short statutes of limitations intended to protect state
one hand, and to the state laws which it employs under section 1988, on the other, is
based on an attempt to distinguish between substance and procedure rather than upon a
distinction between statutes and common law. Professor Kreimer perceives Swift v. Ty-
son, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), whose approach of applying a generous dose of federal
common law in diversity litigation was in effect when the civil rights acts were framed, as
informing Congress's view of the status of federal common law. See Kreimer, supra note
87. I think the current cases reflect the attitude of later diversity cases, see text accom-
panying notes 229-31 infra, by trying to employ federal common law on issues closely
connected with Congress's purposes in enacting the predecessor of section 1983 - like
the question of which state and local officials could avoid liability through friendly state
law, or the breadth of availability of damages - and referring to state law for "proce-
dural" matters. Under Professor Kreiner's approach, any state statute favorable to civil
rights plaintiffs could apply, although unfavorable statutes would be "inconsistent" with
federal policies; under the Supreme Court's approach, state statutes do not apply if they
concern the generously defined "substance" of section 1983, regardless of whether they
favor plaintiffs. To that extent, I prefer Professor Kreimer's thesis, although I do find it
arbitrary to permit the state legislatures and not the state courts to be generous to civil
rights litigants.
103 See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), and note 12 supra.
104 This was the situation in Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837
(1988). See text accompanying notes 252-54 infra for a discussion of whether the ap-
proach of Monessen and Moor is correct.
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officials or to discriminate against civil rights plaintiffs,' 5 it
might also be interpreted as preventing the state or federal court
from adopting a more generous statute of limitations. 06
The Court's principal rationale for the decision to maximize
federal common law and minimize borrowing of state law seems
to be uniformity.10 7 In deciding under section 1988 whether to
borrow state law or to create federal law, the Court has created a
checklist of values which, properly, begins with the goals under-
lying section 1983, mentions federalism, and goes on to include a
desire for uniformity.108 Uniformity is praised as fostering con-
sistency in litigation and also as serving the goal of eliminating
needless litigation over which law to use. 0 9 The federal com-
mon-law approach enforces uniformity in the federal courts and
state courts alike, but sometimes at the expense of procedures
that might benefit civil rights plaintiffs.
Even though the Court has limited the applicability of sec-
tion 1988, there are still areas where state law is borrowed by the
federal courts in section 1983 actions: statutes of limitations,1 0
tolling provisions,"' survivorship statutes, 12 and collateral es-
10I See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984), where the Court struck down a
six-month state statute of limitations as being too short.
The concern that a statute of limitations might discriminate against civil rights
plaintiffs by being overly protective of state or local officials was expressed by the Court
in Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
106 See, e.g., Saldivar v. Cadena, 622 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (a pre-Wilson
case applying a six-year statute of limitations for injury to character or rights instead of
the three-year statute governing personal injury that would have to be applied under
Wilson).
It has been generally assumed that Wilson would apply in state court litigation also
and bind state courts. See cases cited in Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2315. Because Wilson is
based not on an interpretation of the substance of section 1983, but on the deficiency of
federal law under section 1988, I see no reason why the state courts should not be able to
offer section 1983 plaintiffs a more generous limitations period.
107 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-75 (1985). Cf. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881, 953 (1986) (need for uniformity is
an important concern in the decision whether to create federal common law).
108 See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271-75; Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 657
(1983).
109 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. This interest will be explored more fully in Section II
infra.
11 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42
(1984).
" Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478 (1980).
"I Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978). In Robertson, the dissenting jus-
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toppel law.113 At least in these areas, if the Court has properly
interpreted section 1988, Congress may be deemed to have in-
tended the law of the individual states to apply in federal court.
This is significant because Congress must therefore have con-
cluded first, that the states may be permitted some measure of
control over section 1983 litigation, and second, that nationwide
uniformity of procedure in section 1983 is not an overriding
value. 1 4 From state to state, the period provided by the applica-
ble statute of limitations may vary, allowing a plaintiff in New
York three years to commence a section 1983 action" 5 and a
plaintiff in Georgia only two. 1 6 Congress presumably embraces
tices complained that the Court, unusually, was too anxious to borrow a restrictive state
survivorship law when, under the theory of the immunities and damages cases, federal
law does exist on survivorship because there is federal common law. Id. at 596-97 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Compare Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), a Bivens action
against a federal official in which, given the inapplicability of section 1988, the Court did
use a federal common-law right of survivorship.
Professor Neuborne finds Robertson distinguishable from the cases imposing federal
common-law rules because the defendants were not responsible for the decedent's death.
Therefore, their conduct would not be likely to have been affected by adoption of a more
generous rule of survivorship. Neuborne, supra note 4, at 779. Professor Meltzer rejoins
that a survivorship rule is particularly likely to affect civil rights violators, for a potential
defendant beating a potential plaintiff will have an incentive to escalate the use of
deadly force if the death of the potential plaintiff will prevent liability. Meltzer, supra
note 85, at 1172-73. For further discussion of whether survivorship rules are integral to
the purposes of section 1983, compare Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 (majority opinion)
with id. at 600 (dissenting opinion).
On the subject of wrongful death actions in the state courts, see generally Stein-
glass, Availability of Section 1983 as Remedy Creates Confusion in State Courts, Nat'l
L.J., June 2, 1986, at 20, col. 1.
113 Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
114 If one accepts Professor Kreimer's reading of section 1988 as a statute designed
to foster creation of federal common law, see note 87 supra, rather than Professor Cole-
man's interpretation of the statute as primarily an instruction to refer to state law, see
note 90 supra, then the statute does not, as Professor Kreimer says, foreswear all inter-
est in nationwide uniformity, Kreimer, supra note 87, at 620, 630. Professor Eisenberg's
desire to reconstruct section 1988 is based in part on his conclusion, similar to Professor
Kreimer's, that section 1988 should not be read as a wholesale defederalization of civil
rights litigation. Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 509-15.
I do not believe that nationwide uniformity is an important goal in civil rights litiga-
tion. See text accompanying notes 154-73 infra. Accord Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1181
n.267; Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1250-54 (1978). But see Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1975).
"I N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987); see 423 South Salina
Street, Inc. v. Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 503 N.E.2d 63, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986), cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1880 (1987).
16 GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1004 (1974).
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this diversity of procedure. If anything, given the Supreme
Court's generous attitude toward its power to create federal
common law to govern section 1983, Congress may have in-
tended an even greater utilization of state law and, hence, an
even greater range of variation in the adjudication of section
1983 actions in the various federal courts.
On the other hand, section 1988 does promote intrastate
uniformity. The federal courts will differ from each other but
resemble the state courts in their own jurisdictions. On this ba-
sis, the Court seems to have assumed that Congress prizes con-
sistency in adjudication within a given state to an extent that
would justify compelling the state courts to use federal proce-
dures regardless of whether they favor or disfavor civil rights
plaintiffs.'17 But Congress's opinion on this issue is no clearer
than anything else about section 1988. It may be that Congress
was concerned more with predictability than uniformity." 8 If
Congress had authorized the federal courts to choose the proce-
dure most favorable to civil rights plaintiffs, a great deal of liti-
gation would have been engendered about what procedures to
use. The Court's approach avoids this litigation, although it does
not avoid litigation to determine when federal law is deficient or
state law inconsistent with section 1983. It is noteworthy that
section 1988, at least as interpreted by the Court, seems to place
a higher value on some interest other than the impact of a pro-
cedure on a plaintiff's chances of prevailing in a civil rights ac-
tion, but the precise nature of that countervailing interest is
unclear.
Section 1988 seems to be the Supreme Court's chief piece of
evidence that Congress values intrastate uniformity and, there-
fore, would be concerned if state court section 1983 adjudication
differed from federal court adjudication. The provision does not
bear that much weight.
3. Removal
As noted above, one clear purpose underlying section 1983
was Congress's desire to give civil rights plaintiffs the opportu-
"M See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985).
118 Or, it bears repeating, Congress may not have intended section 1988 to apply in
the way the Court has been applying it at all. See note 87 supra.
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nity to choose a federal forum.119 In section 1983 actions, a
plaintiff's choice of forum is absolute if the choice is federal
court, but not if the choice is state court. Defendants have the
power to remove a section 1983 action to federal court.120 Why
should this be? In the past, Congress has given certain plaintiffs
with a federal cause of action an absolute and final choice of
forum. For example, if a plaintiff commences an FELA action in
state court, the defendant is not permitted to remove the action
to federal court.121 Why would Congress have decided that civil
rights plaintiffs were not to have the same unilateral choice
FELA plaintiffs have?
Here again, congressional silence forces us to guess, and my
guess is that Congress simply did not consider this issue. Only a
few members of the 42nd Congress seemed to recognize that a
plaintiff might choose to raise a section 1983 action in state
court.2 2 No one seems to have considered the even more aston-
ishing possibility that a defendant might then choose to retreat
to federal court. Questions of removal, or of who should have the
final choice of forum, simply did not arise.
If Congress had considered this possibility, are there reasons
why Congress might have concluded that the plaintiff's choice of
a state court forum should be subject to veto by the defendant?
Given the nature of section 1983 litigation, the purpose of con-
current jurisdiction, the assumed desirability of encouraging
state court litigation of civil rights claims (particularly where
plaintiff prefers state court), and the fact that the intrastate be-
havior of state officials is at stake, I see no convincing reasons.
The usual reasons for permitting defendants to remove fed-
"9 See note 69 supra.
The general federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982), provides for re-
moval of any civil action of which the federal courts have original jurisdiction "except as
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress."
1 1 See id. § 1445(a) ("A civil action in any State court against a railroad or its
receivers or trustees, arising under sections 51 to 60 of Title 45 [FELA], may not be
removed to any district court of the United States.").
The same is true in antitrust cases, see 15 U.S.C. § 77(v) ("No case arising under
this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be re-
moved to any court of the United States."); in Jones Act cases, see 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1982); in common carrier suits under the Interstate Commerce Act involving an amount
in controversy under $10,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b); and in worker's compensation
cases, see id. § 1445(c).
122 See note 73 supra.
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eral claims to federal court are first, to mollify defendants who
fear that their federal claims or defenses might not be honored
by the state court.12 But the defendants here are state and local
officials. 2 " If state courts have any bias, it is generally assumed
that they will be more hostile to civil rights plaintiffs than to
official defendants.2 5 The second reason is the presumed exper-
tise of the federal courts in analyzing federal questions. State
courts have been gaining experience with interpreting the fed-
eral Constitution.126 But to the extent that federal constitutional
law is unfamiliar to the state courts, it is probably plaintiffs who
will suffer. 127 The American Law Institute has hypothesized that
a state court unfamiliar with federal law might be overly expan-
sive in reading federal law "through misunderstanding as well as
through lack of sympathy.' 28 This speculation does not provide
123 In diversity cases, for example, a diverse defendant who is a resident of the fo-
rum state may not remove an action to federal court, while a diverse defendant who is
not a resident of that state may remove. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The reason underlying
this distinction is presumed to be that nonresidents will need "protection from the local
prejudices of state courts," while residents will not. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721, at 187 (2d ed. 1985).
I1 The defendants, therefore, would be in the same position as the resident diverse
defendants and presumably would not need the assistance of a removal statute to assure
a fair hearing.
125 The state courts are not indifferent in civil rights cases, as they might be in some
other type of federal litigation. State court judges might feel a sense of identification
with the state official defendants or anticipate a more personal reason to restrict official
liability under section 1983. State court judges are themselves subject to section 1983
actions and, although they are immune from suits for damages, are not immune from
injunctive relief or court awards of attorney's fees. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522
(1984). The possible empathy of state court judges with defendants might be exacer-
bated in a case in which plaintiff was a noncitizen of that state.
128 See Aldisert, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 821, 824-30 (1981) (commenting on the extent of state court experience
with federal constitutional issues, even as compared with federal court experience in
some areas).
127 See Neuborne, supra note 11, at 1105-06.
128 See A.L.I, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 192 (1969) [hereinafter A.L.L STUDY].
On this theory, the ALI rejected the positions reflected in Fraser, Some Problems in
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV. 73, 83-84 (1950) and in Wechsler, Fed-
eral Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216,
233-34 (1948), that defendants should be permitted to remove only if they are raising
federal defenses, and not on the basis of a federal claim the plaintiff decided not to bring
in federal court. See A-L.I. STUDY, supra, at 191-92, 194. The ALI rejected this position
despite its recognition that fear of overly expansive state court readings of federal rights
would account for only a very small number of removal cases (with tactical reasons ac-
counting for many more). Id. at 192. In reaching this conclusion, the ALI seemed overly
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enough of a reason for allowing civil rights defendants to over-
rule plaintiff's choice of forum. State courts are trusted with fed-
eral law in FELA and antitrust cases, and their decisions in sec-
tion 1983 cases are generally subject to the review of the state
appellate courts, the Supreme Court, and Congress.
A third reason to allow removal in cases either the plaintiff
or defendant might have brought in federal court is to minimize
the consequences of a race to the courthouse. In some cases, the
state court plaintiff may simply have outrun the defendant, who
would have brought a federal question to be decided in federal
court.129 Removal gives the losing contestant a second chance to
invoke federal jurisdiction. But there is no race to the court-
house in section 1983 actions. It is unlikely that section 1983 de-
fendants would be either able or anxious to enter federal court
as plaintiffs to litigate the constitutionality of their behavior.1 30
The choice of forum is the plaintiff's because only the plaintiff is
likely to have an actionable federal claim.
Finally, federal court litigation of various federal questions
is sometimes encouraged to promote uniformity in the interpre-
tation of federal law. 31 This goal is sensible when nationwide
consistency is significant, as in a case in which an interest of the
impressed with the fact that these removal cases would not add considerably to the fed-
eral courts' caseload, see id. at 194, and insufficiently attentive to the plaintiff's right to
choose a forum. Even if the ALI had accepted the Fraser/Wechsler position, defendants
in section 1983 actions could still remove on the basis of their federal defenses.
"1 For a colorful example of a pitched battle between plaintiff and defendant over
whether litigation would take place in federal or state court, see Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), in which plaintiff sued defendant
in state court, claiming that plaintiff had no right to arbitration, an issue controlled by
federal law, and defendant then filed a diversity action in federal court seeking an order
to compel arbitration. The issue became whether the federal court should stay its action
pending resolution of the state court proceeding. Despite having lost the initial race to
the courthouse, the defendant could have achieved a federal court resolution of the is-
sues without these complications if the case had been removable.
3' State officials wishing to know whether they could constitutionally require school
prayer or establish drunk driving roadblocks, or whether they were immune from suit for
a false arrest they believed legal, would probably be viewed as seeking an advisory opin-
ion. It is only the injury to plaintiffs that gives rise to a case or controversy actionable in
federal court. It is difficult to imagine a case where state or local officials could success-
fully frame an affirmative federal court action to litigate the conduct they would other-
wise litigate as defendants. They would, thus, have no ability, and perhaps no desire, to
race to federal court.
121 See Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IowA L.
REv. 717, 759 (1986) (the need for uniformity of decisions on federal law as a basis for
removal of federal questions, whether raised as claims or defenses).
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federal government itself is at stake. 132 But nationwide consis-
tency is not particularly relevant with respect to collateral law in
section 1983 actions.
In situations in which there is an argument that federal ju-
risdiction should be exclusive, providing concurrent jurisdiction
and allowing defendants to remove is a reasonable compromise.
Concurrent jurisdiction allows the states an opportunity to hear
cases, but also allows either party to invoke federal jurisdiction
if the fears that might have prompted exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion seem justified in a particular case. In the context of section
1983, there is no good argument for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion,13 3 and no reason to believe that section 1983 defendants
will need a federal court retreat to achieve a fair hearing on the
federal issues involved.
Why do defendants actually remove section 1983 cases to
federal court? There are many strategic reasons underlying sec-
tion 1983 defendants' removal petitions, none of which merits
congressional deference. Federal court may offer procedures
favorable to the defense,3 or a particular judge defendants be-
lieve will be sympathetic to them. 35 Federal court may be more
convenient for defendants or their attorneys, or federal proce-
dure more familiar. Put negatively, federal court may be incon-
1'2 Federal officers are among the principal beneficiaries of the federal removal stat-
utes. The officers may remove actions concerning any act under color of office or in the
performance of their duties, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 & 2679(d).
Even those who criticize removal law in other areas would make an exception for
federal officers, see Wechsler, supra note 128, at 234.
133 See text accompanying notes 74-84 supra for an argument that concurrent juris-
diction is highly desirable in this context.
23 These procedures might not be so unfavorable to plaintiff as to be inconsistent
with federal law, but still might be preferable to defendants.
135 A removal petition will be filed after the commencement of the state court suit,
so the defendant, unlike the plaintiff on filing the suit, is likely to know to which state
court judge the case has been assigned before deciding whether to remove.
In some cases, defendants may be able to make a decision about which forum they
prefer based on additional experience with the judge or proceedings in the case. In the
lower court proceedings in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), for example,
plaintiffs had commenced their Bivens action against federal officials in state court. De-
fendants removed to federal court, where they met with some success. See Creighton v.
City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1271 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). A defense summary judgment motion was granted by the
district court on the ground of qualified immunity, at which point the remaining non-
immune defendants moved to remand back to state court and were permitted to do so.
766 F.2d at 1272 n.2.
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venient for plaintiffs or unfamiliar to plaintiffs' attorneys -
plaintiffs chose state court for some reason. Defendants may file
for removal merely to stall or to complicate the litigation in the
hope that the plaintiff will run out of stamina or money. The
removal statute gives defendants enormous power to generate si-
multaneous litigation in state and federal court, or at least pro-
longed litigation over which court will hear which claims," 6 until
the only way the plaintiff can regain control of the litigation and
end up with just one state court lawsuit is to drop the section
1983 claim.137 This situation hardly furthers the goals of the civil
I Proceedings on the removal petition itself add a stage to the litigation. Once a
defendant has filed a removal petition, the plaintiff, who presumably prefers state court,
can file a petition to remand to state court, complicating matters further in order to try
to accomplish the initial goal of having the state court hear the case. A motion to remand
is not likely to succeed if federal issues predominate. See Pueblo Int'l, Inc. v. De
Cardona, 725 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1984); Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. No. 26, 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d
404, reh'g denied, 646 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Complications do not end once the case is removed and any remand petition denied.
If the complaint includes a state cause of action in addition to the section 1983 claim,
the federal court may accept pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim(s). See
Pueblo, 752 F.2d 823. Nevertheless, the federal court may abstain and invite a state
court ruling on state law aspects of the case. See id.; see also Werhan, Pullman Absten-
tion after Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism, 27 WA. & MARY L. REv. 449
(1986), for a thoughtful discussion of the problems caused by the combination of the
abstention doctrine and limitations on the federal court's injunctive powers. If the fed-
eral claim is dismissed later, the pendent state claims will probably also be dismissed,
and will have to be refiled in state court. See Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.
1983).
Alternatively, the district court might exercise its discretion to remand only the
state law claims to state court, causing the plaintiff to have to litigate on two fronts
simultaneously. See Executive Serv. of Miami, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 514
F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Fla. 1981); DiAntonio v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 455 F. Supp. 510
(M.D. Pa. 1978). In fact, the federal court should remand the state claim whenever the
relief requested on that claim is an injunction barred in federal court by Pennhurst.
Avoiding Pennhurst may be the reason the plaintiff chose state court in the first place.
Simultaneous litigation, in addition to exhausting the time and finances of a not particu-
larly affluent group of plaintiffs, also engenders an endless series of procedural imbro-
glios. Which court will enter which phase of the litigation first? Should the federal court
stay its proceedings pending outcome of the state case? What are the collateral estoppel
consequences of various federal or state court decisions? As defendant removal in section
1983 actions increases, these battles are multiplying.
1'7 See, e.g., Austwick v. Board of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (federal
claim dismissed voluntarily after denial of petition for remand); McGann v. Mungo, 578
F. Supp. 1413 (D.S.C. 1982). The court in Austwick, annoyed at the plaintiff for the
"forum hopping" caused by defendant's removal and the subsequent remand petition,
announced that plaintiff had to choose between the state forum and the federal claim
and viewed dismissal of the section 1983 claim with prejudice as appropriate punishment
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rights statutes.
The purpose of section 1983 is to make it easier for plain-
tiffs to vindicate their civil rights. Defendants should not be per-
mitted to undercut plaintiff's choice of a convenient forum. Dur-
ing the debates on the FELA, some members of Congress,
anticipating that plaintiffs might wish to go to state court for
their federal remedy, expressed concern that a plaintiff who
wished to sue in state court should not be inconvenienced by
being compelled to go to a federal court, which might sit a great
distance away.13 8 This concern led to the decision to permit con-
current jurisdiction and to prohibit defendant removal. Had
Congress considered concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights ac-
tions, a similar conclusion about removal might well have been
reached.
Furthermore, if Congress presumably wishes to encourage
state courts to attract civil rights litigation, why, if a state court
has done so by offering an atmosphere attractive to prospective
plaintiffs, should the section 1983 defendant be permitted to
burden the federal courts 3 ' with a case both the plaintiff and
the state court want the state court to hear?140
If Congress purposefully allowed defendants removal power,
then that decision might reflect a congressional unwillingness to
allow plaintiffs too much control, and an unwillingness to en-
force the plaintiff's claim to a favorable state court forum. But
for plaintiff's attempt at "tactical manipulation." 555 F. Supp. at 842-43.
138 See 56 CONG. REC. 4,034 (1910) (statement of Sen. Borah); S. REP. No. 432, 61st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4040-43 (1910).
The anti-removal statutes are thought to protect plaintiffs' right to choose a state
court forum, see Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. Ry. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965), to the extent
that they even permit an exception to diversity jurisdiction, see Kansas City S. R. Co. v.
Leslie, 238 U.S. 599, 602 (1915).
"' Another reason for prohibiting removal in some instances is to spare the federal
courts the burden of cases that involve essentially local disputes. See C. WRIGHT. A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 123, § 3729, at 490.
140 Accord Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1255 n.134 (1978) (arguing that state courts should be
enforcing constitutional norms the federal courts, for institutional reasons not applicable
in the state courts, do not enforce fully, and that allowing defendants removal power
would improperly restrict the ability of the state courts to fill this function). My argu-
ment does not go as far as Professor Sager's because I do not assume that the state
courts will be interpreting the substantive federal constitutional guarantees at issue in
section 1983 litigation more expansively than the federal courts do, but merely that the
state courts may be preferable to plaintiffs for reasons of procedural hospitality, famili-
arity, or simple geographical convenience.
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given that the congressional intent expressed by the removal
statutes does not seem truly intentional, I am reluctant to draw
conclusions from the existence of defendant's removal power, ex-
cept for the conclusion that this situation should be rectified.'
As consideration of all of these relevant statutes shows,
Congress has been so silent on most of the key questions con-
cerning the state courts' role in section 1983 litigation that the
Supreme Court's divining of congressional intent in this area
verges on the psychic. It is difficult to believe that Congress
would not wish to encourage state court litigation of section 1983
actions, a goal the Supreme Court's decisions thus far do pro-
mote. It is also difficult to believe that Congress would not wish
to give civil rights plaintiffs a meaningful choice of forum, but
until Congress speaks more explicitly on that issue, there is little
the Court can do to correct this congressional oversight.'42 The
Court's decisions thus far have benefited civil rights plaintiffs by
compelling the state courts to avoid an overly generous immu-
nity defense, award attorney's fees and forego a restrictive notice
of claim statute. These results might well accord with Congress's
desire to promote a generous remedy for civil rights violations.
But there is little reason to believe that Congress would prize
uniformity to the extent of disadvantaging a plaintiff if state
procedure were more favorable, or that despite section 1988,
Congress would approve of the extent to which the Court has
created federal common law to use in civil rights litigation in
both federal and state court. Congress might not even approve
of its own "decision" about the removal power. And it is cer-
tainly unclear where Congress would fall on the continuum be-
14 To what extent the courts can rectify this situation by using their discretion to
remand section 1983 cases to state court is a matter of some dispute. The district court
in Young v. Board of Educ., 416 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Colo. 1976), ruled that absent a
compelling reason for defendant to remove a section 1983 action to federal court, plain-
tiff's choice of forum should prevail. Although the federal courts are said to take a re-
strictive view of removal out of respect for the state courts, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 123, § 3721, at 214-15, most federal courts have found section
1983 actions to be removable at the defendants' discretion. See, e.g., First Granite City
Nat'l Bank v. City of Troy, No. 87-3692 (S.D. Ill. April 13, 1988); Aben v. Dallwig, 665 F.
Supp. 523, 525 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Spencer v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 657 F. Supp.
66, 67 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (expressly rejecting the argument that defendants must present a
compelling reason to justify removal). See generally Swing, Federal Common Law Power
to Remand a Properly Removed Case, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 583 (1987).
1"2 The removal statute permits removal "except as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added).
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tween Hart's position that a state court is a state court is a state
court 43 and Neuborne's argument that federal procedure should
follow a federal claim into state court wherever it would promote
the federal interest at stake.
II. THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE
The subject of this section is how the choice of collateral
law issues in state court section 1983 actions should be handled.
The previous section demonstrated that expressed congressional
intent does not resolve this question. If Congress wished to be-
come more explicit about its views, it could enact a new statute,
select a standard (favoring Hart or Neuborne, for example) or
address some particular issues, like those previously discussed in
Section I.14 Whether Congress elucidates its intent or not, these
143 "[A] state court does not undergo a metamorphosis into a federal court merely
because it must decide a § 1983 suit. No matter what the nature of the action before an
Indiana state court, it remains a state court. As Gertrude Stein observed, a 'rose is a rose
is a rose.'" Thompson v. Medical Licensing Bd., 180 Ind. App. 333, 398 N.E.2d 679, 680
(1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
144 I am assuming, for the purposes of this Article, that Congress could go as far as it
wished in imposing federal procedure on the state courts. The FELA cases, discussed in
text accompanying notes 184-202 infra, interpreted congressional intent as imposing a
fairly heavy dose of federal law on the states. The cases never suggested that a constitu-
tional boundary was being approached. At some point, however, if Congress were to go to
the extreme, the shadowy constitutional principles that informed the decision in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) - possibly related to the tenth amendment
("[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively," U.S. CONsT. amend. X) - would
arise. On the significance of the constitutional basis of Erie, concerning the propriety of
imposing federal common law in the adjudication of state substantive claims, see Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 702-03 (1974) (tenth amendment
does not create state enclave, but simply restates negatively the necessity for the federal
government to have a constitutional basis for its actions); Friendly, In Praise of Erie -
and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1964) (constitu-
tional basis of Erie is not dictum, but necessary part of Court's argument).
Congress's power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5, pursuant to which section 1983 was enacted, is regarded as
extensive, see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976) (legislation enacted
under section five of the fourteenth amendment overrides the eleventh amendment); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1880) (section five of the fourteenth amendment
was intended to expand the powers of Congress and limit the powers of the states), but
presumably not limitless.
For more recent case law taking a relatively expansive view of Congress's power to
impose federal requirements on the states, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling holding of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), that the tenth amendment limits federal authority to interfere with
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issues will have to be addressed by the courts on a case-by-case
basis. 4 '
In Felder v. Casey, the Supreme Court began the process of
formulating its own approach to these questions. Despite the
Court's misleading portrayal of its decision as a simple matter of
implementing congressional intent, what the Court actually did
in Felder, as it must do in any similar case, was to balance the
relative state and federal interests involved. Because the Felder
Court did not acknowledge this, it did not discuss the state and
federal interests actually at stake, and in fact appeared to adopt
a cavalier attitude toward the state's interest, finding that the
state's interest is "not material" in a supremacy clause inquiry.
Both the federal and state interests involved are more complex
than the Court's opinion suggests and deserve a much more
open and honest appraisal. In addition, the Court has posited
that uniformity is an important interest that weighs heavily in
the balance. If this preoccupation with uniformity abates, as I
argue it should, the real question is whether the relative state
state sovereignty over labor standards); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (permitting imposition of federal procedural requirements on
state utility regulatory authorities). See also Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1169 & n.198. An
interesting perspective on this issue is brought by Professor Aithouse's observation that
the states' sphere, rather than being a perceptible and unyielding entity, is what is left
after appropriate federal power is exercised. See Althouse, How to Build a Separate
Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1987).
' Whether the Court should be considered less free than Congress to wield the
power of the supremacy clause is an important question. I tend to agree with the com-
mentators who argue that the Court should take a more modest role, and, therefore,
should be hesitant to supersede state law in the absence of congressional action. See
Hart, supra note 24, at 497; Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1168-69 ("state law is presump-
tively operative, and if it is to be displaced, ordinarily it must be Congress that does
so"); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969) (principles of feder-
alism suggest that presumption of applicability of state law may be displaced only in
exceptional circumstances in which congressional purposes require subordination of state
law).
Professor Field, who has championed a broad view of the power of the courts to
create federal common law, might disagree that the courts should be more hesitant than
Congress, given that a statutory source of authority exists in section 1983. See Field,
supra note 107, at 923-27 (discussing support for the proposition that the federal courts'
power to create common law is coextensive with Congress's power to legislate); see also
Friendly, supra note 144, at 407 ("[Sltate courts must conform to federal decisions in
areas where Congress, acting within powers granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so
lightly, an intention to that end."). For a related argument that congressional silence
should lead to judicial reluctance to impose concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts,
see Sandalow, supra note 71, at 207.
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and federal interests warrant an approach closer to Hart's, al-
lowing the states to use their own procedures unless they are
distinctly in contravention of federal purposes, or an approach
closer to Neuborne's, requiring the states to use federal proce-
dures whenever plaintiffs' prospects in civil rights litigation
would thereby be enhanced.
My conclusion, somewhere in the middle, but probably
closer to the position I have characterized as Hart's, is that the
states should be permitted to use their own neutral procedures
so long as those procedures are not so inconsistent with the pur-
poses of section 1983 as to warrant judicial exercise of the
supremacy clause, regardless of whether those procedures are
more or less generous to plaintiffs than federal procedure would
have been.
In this section, I will discuss the federal and state interests
in the balance, and how they are served or disserved by each of
these paradigms. I will then address to what extent other consid-
erations, such as the need for uniformity or concern with effi-
ciency of adjudication, should enter the balance. In the following
section, I will discuss the validity of answering the questions
posed here by referring to precedent in two purportedly analo-
gous areas of the law - the FELA concurrent jurisdiction cases,
and the "mirror image" Erie cases.
A. The Balance of Interests
1. Defining the Federal Interest and Choosing a Standard
The initial question is how the federal interest at stake
should be defined: in terms of the ultimate goal of deterring civil
rights violations, or in terms of the broader instrumental goal of
enabling more plaintiffs to win civil rights cases? Is the federal
interest at stake here an interest in preventing the states from
applying state laws that defeat federal rights, or in compelling
the states to apply federal laws that enhance federal rights?
In Felder, the difference between these two inquiries was
not significant because the notice of claim provision falls into
the former category - a state law that tended to annihilate the
federal right by disabling plaintiffs from bringing suit at all. Ex-
amples of procedures falling into the other category include Pro-
[Vol. 54: 1057
BEYOND PARITY
fessor Neuborne's example of class action rules,146 or discovery
rules and rules of evidence. If a state has restrictive class action
rules, civil rights plaintiffs would certainly benefit if the state
court were to adopt more generous federal class action law. But
is it fair to say that less generous state class action rules defeat
the rights protected by section 1983? It may be that fewer plain-
tiffs will prevail in section 1983 claims due to a state court's re-
fusal to certify a class, but it is unlikely that state or local offi-
cials will thereby be encouraged to more freely violate civil
rights, especially given the fact that those plaintiffs could have
circumvented the state rules by going to federal court.
Given Congress's silence, I think the Court should opt for
the more modest definition of the federal interest at stake,
which yields more room for accommodating the state courts' in-
terests and general concerns of federalism. If a state law can be
fairly characterized as inconsistent with section 1983, as was the
case in Felder and in Martinez, then it is proper for the Su-
preme Court to use the supremacy clause to prohibit the state
from applying that law. Further, if Congress has specified a par-
ticular procedure it wishes to compel the state courts to use -
as the Court believed Congress had done in singling out the at-
torney's fees provision of section 198817 - then it is proper for
the Court to compel the state court to use that procedure. But if
Congress has not specified that a particular collateral rule is to
be considered part of section 1983, and if it cannot be fairly said
that a state collateral rule is inconsistent with the deterrent goal
of section 1983, then I do not think the Supreme Court should
exercise the power of supremacy clause to compel the states to
follow federal collateral law simply because that law would bene-
fit civil rights plaintiffs. To that extent, I find Hart's theory that
concurrent jurisdiction assumes a choice between two different
procedural systems persuasive. As long as a fair federal forum is
available, there is little risk that illegal conduct by the class of
potential defendants will be encouraged by procedural disadvan-
tages plaintiffs might encounter in state court. 48
"46 See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 740-42, 783-84 (detailing the difficulties of bring-
ing a class action under New York's old, and even new, class action laws, and urging
application of the more generous federal class action rules in all state court section 1983
actions).
247 See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
148 The Court's references to "outcome-determinative" state laws in Felder v. Casey,
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2. The State's Interests
The Court's remark in Felder that the state's interests were
"not material" must be read in the context of that case. The
state's principal interest in the notice of claim statute was in
protecting its subdivisions and officials from the very liability
section 1983 imposes.14 9 If Congress wishes to impose liability,
and the state's interest is to avoid liability, then the state's in-
terest may be disregarded as illegitimate. This is apparently
what the Court meant by declaring the state's interest to be im-
material to the supremacy clause inquiry."'
If the state's interest is not legitimate, or if the state's use of
108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988), may suggest agreement with this principle. An outcome-determi-
native state law - like a notice of claim provision, immunity defense, or other law that
would tend to defeat plaintiffs who would not have been defeated in federal court - is
likely to be inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983. Such a law would thwart a
category of plaintiffs' very attempt to litigate. The Court's concern with outcome-deter-
minative state law presumably only applies to laws that would determine the outcome in
a way adverse to plaintiffs. There should not be any problem if a state court wishes to
award a plaintiff a victory unattainable in federal court, as long as the state has not
exceeded the "substance" of section 1983. See text accompanying notes 252-54 infra.
It is difficult to reconcile the court's theory in Felder with the case of Robertson v.
Wegmann, see note 112 supra, in which the Court allowed a federal court adjudicating a
section 1983 action to apply a state survivorship rule precluding the plaintiff's action.
That rule could be characterized as outcome-determinative.
149 Other interests are also served by the notice of claim statute - for example,
avoiding stale litigation - but the Court seemed to regard these as secondary, or per-
haps as already adequately covered by the relevant statute of limitations, possibly cho-
sen as a matter of federal law under the principles of Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261
(1985). See text accompanying notes 99-116 supra.
150 Had the state's interest been a legitimate one, the state court's dismissal of Fel-
der's action for failure to comply with the notice of claim provision could have been
viewed as an adequate procedural state ground, barring Supreme Court review. See
Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1144; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (state default
rule serving legitimate state interest is an adequate state ground precluding Supreme
Court review). The Court could have found the state ground not to be adequate, in that
it overly burdened federal rights. See Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1142-45. But the Court
avoided treating the issue as one of whether an adequate state ground was presented by
viewing the notice of claim statute as preempted by the law of section 1983. There
should be considerable overlap between the inquiry under the adequate state ground
doctrine (where, if the state's interest is not legitimate, or if the state's rule unreasonably
burdens a federal right, the state is not permitted to rely on its usual procedure) and the
question of whether to view a federal statute as authorizing creation of federal common
law that then supplants relevant state procedural law. In the latter context, the Court
has been focusing on the federal interest at stake and misty "congressional intent" and,
therefore, has not looked carefully at the nature of the state's interest. The court should
be asking the same questions about legitimacy of the state interest and burden on fed-
eral rights asked in connection with the adequate state ground doctrine.
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an apparently neutral procedural rule does in fact discriminate
against federal claim plaintiffs," 1 the balance is clear and the
federal interest must prevail. But what of a case in which the
state has legitimate interests that do not join issue with congres-
sional intent? If, for example, a state wishes to use its usual re-
strictive class action rules, discovery rules, or rules of evidence
only because they are efficient and familiar (and perhaps be-
cause these rules are being followed with respect to another
claim in the same case), should that state interest be deemed
"not material"? The Court in Felder several times distinguishes
the notice of claim provision from a "neutral and uniform appli-
cable rule of procedure."' 52 Presumably, the state's interest in
following its own procedural rules is cognizable and should enter
the balance when the Court is considering whether to override a
state procedure. These interests include the state court's interest
in following its own rules because those rules are familiar, be-
cause they are the rules possibly being applied to other claims in
the same case and, therefore, will promote efficient litigation, be-
cause the rules may be well adapted to that particular state or
court, and because of the dignitary interest the states have in
making their own procedural decisions.
It is difficult to predict how heavily the Supreme Court
would weigh these state housekeeping interests and correlative
federalism concerns as against the federal interests involved.
The Court's attitude toward the significance of such procedural
interests has been wildly inconsistent, varying from context to
context. 53 Federalism concerns do argue for allowing the state
Il This was one of the theories the Court invoked in Felder, taking the broad view
that a state law applied most frequently against a federal claimant discriminates against
federal claimants, even if the law seems to be applied even handedly. See 108 S. Ct. 2302
(1988); supra note 45.
For an inquiry into the constitutional basis for the antidiscrimination doctrine, see
Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1162.
1 02 8 S. Ct. at 2308.
'5 The FELA cases, for example, do not assign a very high value to the state's
housekeeping interests. See text accompanying notes 184-204 infra for a discussion of
these cases, which impose a substantial amount of federal procedure to accompany the
federal claim into state court. In other areas, however, the Court has been much more
deferential to the state courts' procedural concern with efficiency of adjudication. In ap-
plying the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, for example, the Court will,
at least in some circumstances, accept a state's procedural default rule as an adequate
state ground precluding Supreme Court review of a federal constitutional claim. See note
150 supra. For critiques of this doctrine, see Meltzer, supra note 85 (proposing the for-
1989]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
courts some leeway to use their own procedures, and efficiency
argues for allowing the states to use their accustomed rules in
multiclaim litigation. But these concerns must yield when a
state procedure actually is inconsistent with the purposes of sec-
tion 1983.
3. Uniformity
Prominent in the Court's opinion in Felder, as in the sec-
tion 1988 cases discussed previously, is the notion that collateral
law followed in federal and state court section 1983 actions
should be identical for the sake of intrastate uniformity. The
Court deplores the possibility that the same case might turn out
differently in state or federal court because of a difference in the
two jurisdictions' collateral law."" This concern too should be
confined to its context. If the reason the cases would turn out
differently is that the state has an outcome-determinative law
that prevents plaintiff from bringing a claim, then it has already
been established that the state should not be permitted to apply
that inconsistent law. But if the case turns out differently be-
cause a seemingly neutral procedure has in fact disadvantaged
the plaintiff - or, for that matter, disadvantaged the defendant
- is that a problem? Is there really some independent value to
mulation of federal common-law rule to govern forfeitures of federal rights in both state
and federal court); Sandalow, supra note 71 (proposing more modest revisions of the
adequate state procedural ground doctrine); Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1043 (1977).
An even broader doctrine permitting a state to preclude consideration of federal
claims in order to serve interests of federalism exists in the context of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (failure to raise federal
claim in state proceeding bars federal habeas corpus review unless petitioner can show
cause and prejudice). See Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of
State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. CHL L. REv. 741 (1982). The Court has at times viewed
the interests in permitting procedural default in habeas corpus petitions and on direct
appeal differently, and has applied different rules in the two contexts, although federal
habeas corpus is meant to be an understudy for Supreme Court review.
In contrast to the FELA cases, the diversity cases place a high value on the house-
keeping interests of federal court as balanced against the state's interest in its substan-
tive law, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (relying on Congress's involvement
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to justify allowing the federal courts to follow
their own rules in diversity litigation). See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND
MATERIALS 527 (3d ed. 1982), for a criticism of the Court's differential treatment of
housekeeping interests depending on whether they surface in state or in federal court.
'1 See 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
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parity of procedure between state and federal court in section
1983 actions? I doubt it.
Uniformity is both served and disserved whichever choice of
procedure is made. If state court section 1983 actions look like
federal court section 1983 actions, they achieve that uniformity
at the price of uniformity with other state court actions (often
including a tort claim joined in the same case). If state court
actions follow state procedure, the price is sacrificing some pro-
cedural uniformity with actions in the federal court sitting
within that same state.15 5 The value of applying uniform proce-
dures in a state court case containing section 1983 and other
state law claims is obvious. Litigation is simplified and the possi-
bility of contradictory commands is avoided. Borrowing federal
procedure on one out of two or three claims in a case might lead
to a situation in which the federal claim is entitled to class ac-
tion treatment, or a jury trial, and the state claims are not. Must
there be two trials, or might the plaintiff get a jury trial on a
state law issue simply because section 1983 was invoked in the
complaint?156 These issues are troubling to the state courts, as
well as to attorneys confronting these procedural imbroglios.
The virtues of federal/state uniformity are somewhat more
elusive. Disparity in procedure has several possible negative ef-
fects. First, defendants might feel encouraged to violate the civil
rights of potential plaintiffs if state procedure makes it too diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to succeed in a civil rights action. As noted
previously, 157 it would be foolish for defendants to change their
behavior if plaintiff could avoid procedural difficulties by simply
choosing federal court.
Disparity of procedure might itself be considered problem-
atic. If a plaintiff in a state court section 1983 action could not
bring a class action when a plaintiff in a federal court section
1983 action with the same claim could, 158 is this asymmetry
115 The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of state law applicable
in federal court under section 1988 increases the likelihood of this disparity. See text
accompanying notes 88-118 supra.
" The Supreme Court once held that something like this should happen. In McAl-
lister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), the plaintiff brought a federal and
a state law claim in state court. The Court held that the statute of limitations applying
to the federal claim should also apply to the state law claim, on the theory that this
would give plaintiff full benefit of the federal right. Id. at 226.
'17 See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
"l In the diversity cases, this concern was cast as the unfairness of allowing plain-
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more than an aesthetic concern? The Supreme Court suggests
that such disparity may threaten interests of federalism. 5 " If
state procedures are less favorable than federal procedures,
plaintiffs will bring their section 1983 actions in federal rather
than state court, despite the earlier conclusion that state court
adjudication of section 1983 actions should be encouraged.'60
But uniformity trims the good as well as the bad. Plaintiffs may
be tempted by state court procedures as well as repelled. The
central aim of federalism is to give the states enough room to
follow their own paths. If a state is offended by the fact that too
many plaintiffs are turning to federal court to litigate their sec-
tion 1983 actions, the solution is simple. The state courts or leg-
islatures may offer procedures as attractive as they wish - un-
less they are constricted by federally imposed uniformity.
Another reason to be concerned about federal/state uni-
formity is fear of forum shopping. Deploring forum shopping is a
principal activity of some diversity cases,'' on the apparent as-
sumption that forum shopping is an unmitigated evil. But what
is wrong with forum shopping? Section 1983 was enacted to pro-
vide plaintiffs with an opportunity to shop for a forum in a situ-
ation in which the states had an unwholesome monopoly. Even
in diversity cases, the evil reputation of forum shopping has
been questioned.1 2 The opportunity to select a forum is an inte-
gral feature of any concurrent jurisdiction statute. Concurrent
jurisdiction in this context is, as Professor Neuborne says, a
"self-correcting constitutional compass,"'' 3 because plaintiffs
will choose the forum they consider more promising. The abhor-
rence of forum shopping in the diversity cases derives from com-
ity concerns not present in this context. 6 4 It may be undesirable
to divert litigation of state law disputes to federal court by
tiff's choice of forum to change the character as well as the result of the litigation, see,
e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965), and was considered to verge on an equal
protection problem. See id. at 469.
159 See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980).
160 See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
1' See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468; Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1937).
162 See Ely, supra note 145, at 710 (forum shopping is evil only if it leads to evil);
Hart, supra note 24, at 512 (avoiding forum shopping was a trivial concern in Erie; the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to permit forum shopping).
l Neuborne, supra note 4, at 731.
164 See Hart, supra note 24, at 513.
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promising procedures advantageous to plaintiffs, but there is no
comity problem if advantageous procedures attract civil rights
plaintiffs with federal claims to state court.165
Furthermore, the prospect of eliminating forum shopping is
illusory. Total uniformity between federal and state court in sec-
tion 1983 litigation is unachievable. Even if Congress were to
make clear its desire to apply federal collateral rules broadly,'66
there would still be significant differences between the state and
federal forum that Congress would be unable or unlikely to do
anything about. Among the features of federal court that might
continue to attract plaintiffs are the life tenure of federal judges,
and some of the other institutional characteristics Professor
Neuborne has enumerated.6 7 Among the unique features of
state court section 1983 litigation are the inapplicability of the
eleventh amendment, 68 which might enable a state court plain-
tiff to sue the state16 or to collect money unavailable in a fed-
eral court proceeding; 70 the inapplicability of restrictions like
the tax anti-injunction statute,' 7' which leaves the state court as
the only possible forum in some cases challenging state tax sys-
tems or decision; the inapplicability of the equitable restraint
U5 If the state procedures are more favorable to plaintiffs (a situation most compa-
rable to the converse situation Hanna feared), civil rights litigants will stay in state
court, presumably, and there will be no comity problems. If the state may and does
choose to offer procedures less favorable to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs go to federal court,
any comity problem is mitigated by the fact that the decision was the state's. The federal
courts do nothing but that which Congress enacted section 1983 to accomplish - offer
their usual procedures to those civil rights plaintiffs who feel the need of them.
"" Congress might decide, for example, to apply to state court section 1983 actions
all the federal procedures imposed in the FELA cases, see text accompanying notes 184-
214 infra, or even more.
167 See Neuborne, supra note 11, at 1121-28.
"I "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
169 Even with the bar of the eleventh amendment removed, the plaintiff might nev-
ertheless be unable to sue the state because of the constraints of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, or perhaps because the state is not a "person" within the meaning of section
1983. See Smith v. State, Dep't of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987),
cert. granted sub nom., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
170 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (federal court may not award retro-
active welfare benefits to be paid by state officials due to restrictions of the eleventh
amendment).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
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doctrine of Younger v. Harris172 and succeeding cases; and the
probable inapplicability of other federal doctrines limiting in-
junctive relief.173 There will and should be forum shopping, so
the desire for federal/state uniformity as an antidote does not
provide a strong reason to modify state procedures or collateral
rules.
Professor Neuborne, the chief proponent of procedural par-
ity between state and federal courts, rests his argument not on
the inherent desirability of parity, and certainly not on any dis-
like of forum shopping, but rather on the assumption that fed-
eral collateral law generally is superior to state collateral law in
ways that will promote civil rights litigation.1 4 Professor
Neuborne draws this conclusion because of his focus on exam-
ples, like the federal class action rules, in which federal collat-
eral law would be more attractive to plaintiffs. 175 It is certainly
true that in particular instances federal law will favor civil rights
plaintiffs, but I do not think that the superiority of federal col-
lateral law provides a strong basis for arguing for procedural
parity with federal court generally. Whatever may have been the
case in earlier decades, federal collateral law is now less notable
for its favorable attitude toward civil rights litigation. Professor
Neuborne's self-avowed preference for federal court as an insti-
tutional matter 76 is more and more under siege as the Supreme
Court riddles federal court civil rights litigation with doctrines
172 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See note 244 infra.
173 See text accompanying notes 240-44 infra.
... The test Professor Neuborne actually proposes for choosing between state and
collateral law does not rest on notions of parity, but rather on what will serve the policies
of section 1983. See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 779-80.
175 See id. at 735-48. Professor Neuborne also suggests that federal court rules are
more familiar to civil rights litigators, and that state court adoption of familiar and uni-
form federal collateral law will therefore promote civil rights litigation. Id. at 734-35.
Although federal law may be familiar to Professor Neuborne and the handful of lawyers
who make a career of civil rights litigation, I have already expressed my suspicion that it
is far less familiar to the majority of lawyers litigating section 1983 claims. The overlap
of section 1983 and state tort law should be recalled. I suspect that many lawyers find
their first section 1983 claim lurking in what they had thought was a straightforward
false arrest or state administrative law case. In a time when support for institutional civil
rights litigation has dwindled along with the federal courts' tolerance for the cases that
typified civil rights litigation in the 1960s and early 1970s, I think that encouraging law-
yers who customarily practice in the state courts to litigate section 1983 claims when
appropriate will do more for the vitality of civil liberties than will making the belea-
guered civil liberties bar feel more at home in the state courts.
M See Neuborne, supra note 11, at 1105-06; Neuborne, supra note 4, at 726.
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limiting federal relief. Standing,177 the Pennhurst doctrine,'1 8
the expanding Younger v. Harris179 doctrine, and many more de-
velopments in a list that could consume pages, plague federal
court section 1983 plaintiffs. If the true goal is not parity but
promotion of civil rights by advantaging civil rights plaintiffs,
wholesale imposition of federal collateral law is becoming a less
productive means of serving that goal. 80
Given that state court section 1983 plaintiffs have a choice
of forum and that imposing procedural consistency with federal
court will mean sacrificing consistency within the state courts as
well as the prospect of state courts developing procedures bene-
ficial to plaintiffs, the desirability of federal/state uniformity
should not shift the balance of the relative state and federal in-
terests at stake. Even if the Court's section 1988 decisions do
not misconstrue congressional intent in their urge for uniformity
in federal court section 1983 litigation, the concern for the type
of uniformity reflected in those cases is not a valid goal in the
state court context. A more worthwhile goal, cited by the Su-
preme Court as a desirable consequence of uniformity, is elimi-
nating the prospect of unnecessary litigation over which proce-
dure to use.' Serving this goal requires not uniformity but
predictability. Any approach providing predictability will serve
this goal, regardless of whether it dictates results uniform among
state courts, among federal and state courts, or some combina-
tion of the two.
If uniformity is read out as an important goal, if the federal
interest at stake is defined as deterring civil rights violations,
and if the state interest in using its own procedure is factored
M" See notes 241-42 infra.
" See note 240 infra.
179 See note 244 infra.
110 Half of the disadvantageous state court procedures Professor Neuborne found
most troubling, see Neuborne, supra note 4, at 736, have been addressed by the Supreme
Court's recent section 1988 cases (including some cases which Professor Neuborne notes,
as they were decided before his article was written). States may not use short statutes of
limitations periods, or perhaps even decide which limitations periods to use, see text
accompanying notes 99-106 supra; the law of immunities under section 1983 has been
nationalized, see text accompanying notes 93-96 supra; and the state courts are required
to provide attorney's fees, see text accompanying notes 31-36 supra. This leaves discov-
ery procedures, class action rules, and strict evidentiary and pleading rules as areas in
which Professor Neuborne suggests that the states might provide plaintiffs an additional
advantage by following federal law.
"'1 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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into the balance, the Court should tend to allow the states to use
their own collateral law in areas like class action rules and rules
of evidence. The Court so far has not seemed to indulge in any
presumption in favor of allowing the states to use their own pro-
cedure, in part because of its generous view of the propriety of
creating federal common law under section 1983, and in part be-
cause of its reliance on cases in areas of the law in which the
need for uniformity and the relative state and federal interests
at stake are different.
B. Cross-Forum Conflict Law
The Court in Felder seemed to accept the premise, set forth
in several law review articles' 82 that the FELA cases and diver-
sity cases are analogous precedents to be consulted when choice
of law issues arise in state court section 1983 actions.183 Profes-
sor Neuborne, in fact, stitched these precedents into a cross-fo-
rum law of conflicts, from which both rules and results could be
derived.
I do not think that the particular results of the FELA or
diversity cases may simply be borrowed to resolve debates about
choice of law in civil rights cases. The policies underlying the
FELA and diversity cases, and the interpretations of the differ-
ent statutory schemes are distinct and represent a balance of
different interests.
1. The FELA Cases
The Federal Employers' Liability Acts (FELA),'8 4 enacted
in 1908, effected various changes in the common-law rules gov-
erning liability of the railroads for negligent injuries to employ-
ees. ' The Acts were intended to "promote the safety of the em-
ployees and to advance the commerce in which they are
engaged."""" Viewing the railroad as a "unitary enterprise,"' 87
Congress believed that a "national law, operating uniformly in
182 See note 215 infra.
183 See 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
284 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
I' These changes included abrogation of the fellow servant rule and other reforms
of substantive tort law.
86 In re Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912).
817 See Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 330 (1958).
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all the States, upon all carriers by railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, would better subserve the needs of that com-
merce." '188 Like section 1983, the FELA was presumed to confer
concurrent jurisdiction. 89 In upholding the constitutionality of
the statute, the Supreme Court was careful to note that Con-
gress had not attempted to control the "modes of procedure" in
the state courts. 190
Early cases defined the state courts' procedural realm
broadly. 19' Later cases, however, regularly required the state
courts to adopt federal procedure whenever that procedure ad-
vantaged plaintiffs. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama,92 for ex-
ample, prohibited the state of Georgia from applying its strict
pleading rules in an FELA case, holding that the state may not
use its own mode of procedure when that procedure imposes
"unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by fed-
eral laws."'' 93 If a state were permitted to set such "springes, ' '1 94
reasoned the Court, "desirable uniformity in adjudication of fed-
erally created rights could not be achieved.' 95 Following in this
,s 223 U.S. at 51 (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 55-59. Amendments to the FELA in 1910 made this assumption explicit,
see 45 U.S.C. § 56 ("The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chap-
ter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states.") (emphasis added).
See 56 CONG. REc. 4043, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) ("[T]he state courts are perfectly
competent to decide federal questions arising before them, and it is their duty to do
SO.").
100 223 U.S. at 56. Congress's initial attempt to regulate in this area had been held
unconstitutional by the Court. See The Employers' Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).
1'9 In Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), the Court
found that a state law authorizing a nonunanimous jury could be applied in a state court
FELA action. The Court's opinion focused on the dictates of federalism, the need for
respecting the integrity of state procedure, and the belief that to interpret the FELA as
imposing federal jury trial law on the states would be to allow Congress to bootstrap its
way into applying the seventh amendment right to a jury trial to the states. In light of
these concerns, the Court found that the rights conferred under the FELA were to be
administered "in accordance with the modes of procedure prevailing in [state] courts."
Id. at 218. See also Dickinson v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631 (1918).
In the later case of Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., 279 U.S.
377 (1929), the Court's concern with the integrity of state procedure led to upholding a
state's refusal to hear an FELA case when the state had a "valid excuse" based on its
own neutral procedure - in this case state law imposing limitations on suits against out-
of.state corporations.
192 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
193 Id. at 298.
'' See id.; see also Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923), where Justice Holmes
appears to have first used this term.
195 338 U.S. at 299.
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mode, Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R. Co. " required a state court to
employ federal law on the allocation of function between judge
and jury.19" The Court in Dice waxed eloquent about the
supremacy of federal law and the critical importance of uniform
application of the FELA98 and developed a theory enabling any
"procedure" disadvantaging plaintiffs to be overridden, for if it
disadvantaged plaintiffs, it would not be considered proce-
dural. 9 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in both these cases, 2 0
argued that a litigant who chooses to enforce a federal right in
state rather than federal court should not be heard to complain
about the state's procedures.2"' His view that choosers should
not be beggars never came to command a majority of the
Court.202
On occasion, the Court relinquished its concern for uniform-
ity and allowed the state courts to use a "procedure" benefiting
FELA plaintiffs. 20 3 But for the most part, the Court has federal-
342 U.S. 359 (1952).
Clearly disliking the state law at issue - that the validity of a release relied
upon by defendant was to be determined by the judge rather than the jury - the Court
reasoned that the right to a jury trial is part and parcel of the remedy afforded by the
FELA, and that the federal right might be defeated if the state were permitted to apply
its own law. Id. at 361, 363. In Brown, the Court had also disliked the state law in ques-
tion, referring to it as "harsh" and out of date. Id. at 362.
19' Uniform application was described as "essential" to effectuate the purposes of
the FELA. Id. at 361.
199 This concept bears a striking resemblance to the test for choice of law in diver-
sity cases prevailing when Dice was decided: the outcome-determinative test of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The Supreme Court's reliance in Felder on the
FELA cases may explain why that opinion harkens back to the outcome-determinative
concept. It was in Brown, in fact, that Justice Frankfurter first suggested that concurrent
jurisdiction cases pose an Erie question in reverse. 338 U.S. at 301.
Compare Dice to Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), in
which the Court, faced with a similar issue, held that the federal housekeeping interest
prevailed, and that the federal court was to use its own procedure. See text accompany-
ing note 231 infra.
20 As the Court's view of Congress's intent to supplant state procedures and ensure
uniform results grew more generous, opposition mounted. From the unanimity of Born-
bolis, supra note 191, the Court moved to a 7-2 decision in Brown, and then to a 5-4
decision in Dice.
201 Dice, 342 U.S. at 364; see also Brown, 338 U.S. at 299-300.
202 More recent FELA cases continue in the Dice mold. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (federal law governs introduction of evidence
about the effect of taxes on a decedent's projected earnings in a state court FELA
action).
103 See Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924) (state
court FELA plaintiff secured jurisdiction by attachment to hold an initial carrier liable
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ized FELA litigation in the state courts, and not always to the
benefit of the plaintiff. In one recent FELA case, for example,
the Court held that federal common law governing damages ap-
plies in state court FELA cases and bars a state court from ap-
plying a state law awarding prejudgment interest to an FELA
plaintiff.204 Here is a brand of uniformity inimical to plaintiffs.
Are the FELA cases, with their heavy imposition of federal
procedure on state court litigation, truly analogous to the section
1983 cases? Certainly many of the themes are familiar. But the
context is distinguishable, and so are the results. The FELA
cases do establish that Congress possesses the power to impose
federal procedure to accompany the substance of its enactments.
They also reflect the Supreme Court's willingness, here as in
Felder, to devalue the state's interest in its own procedures
when necessary to serve federal goals, and to aggrandize the in-
terest in uniformity. But Congress's goals in the FELA cases
make the generous imposition of federal procedure more appro-
priate than it would be in the section 1983 context.
The congressional intent underlying the FELA is signifi-
cantly different from the intent of section 1983. Congress was
deemed to have contemplated nationwide uniformity as a cen-
tral aim in enacting the FELA.20 Railroads susceptible to fed-
eral control by definition operate in interstate commerce. If rail-
roads were subject to different standards20 in each state in
which they operated, they would suffer the problem of Pavlov's
dogs and experience difficulty in planning their behavior. Sec-
tion 1983, in contrast, is aimed at the misconduct of state offi-
cials and, unlike the FELA, deals with intrastate activity. If the
fifty states were to develop different modes of procedure for ad-
judicating the constitutionality of state officials' behavior, sym-
metry would be lost, but the officials of each state would have no
trouble determining which state's law to watch.
The statutory scheme surrounding the FELA is also differ-
for the negligence of a connecting carrier, without personal service of process - a proce-
dure unavailable in federal court).
21' Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988).
See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
, The railroads would not, of course, be subject to different substantive standards.
But having different procedures apply to a prospective defendant in more than one juris-
diction would certainly affect that prospective defendant's ability to assess the likelihood
of a certain course of conduct leading to liability.
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ent from that of section 1983 in several ways. First, Congress
gave FELA plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum, which it did
not give to civil rights plaintiffs.207 If this discrepancy repre-
sented a decision and not mere inattention, it could be signifi-
cant. One might speculate that giving defendants removal power
makes it less critical to force the state courts to adopt federal
procedure for the sake of fairness to defendants. It is one thing
to impose federal procedure on a state court where an unwilling
defendant is trapped; it may be quite another to do so when the
defendant is free to use removal to avoid any undesirable state
procedure, or to gain any perceived benefit federal court might
provide defendants. (If, in fact, the federal procedure benefited
the plaintiff, the plaintiff presumably would have chosen the
federal forum in the first place.) In both circumstances, either
party has access to a forum Congress presumably deems fair. In
the FELA context, Congress wished to allow a state forum, but
that desire was balanced by a desire for nationwide uniformity;
Congress wished to allow plaintiffs a unilateral choice of forum,
but also recognized a defendant's entitlement to fair proce-
dures.208 The compromise forged out of these competing goals,
to serve the interests both of uniformity and of fairness, was a
generous approach in applying federal procedure in the state
court context.209
In addition, in the FELA context there is no statute compa-
rable to 42 U.S.C. section 1988,210 which requires the federal
courts to follow state law in some instances. Thus, Congress had
not allocated any role for state law in FELA cases. In fact, the
primary goal of the FELA was not, unlike section 1983, to pro-
vide a federal forum, but rather to provide federal rules of deci-
207 See text accompanying notes 119-42 supra.
208 Congress may also have had some interest in sparing the federal courts the bur-
den of this fount of litigation in cases in which plaintiffs were content with state court.
209 One problem with this theory is that it does not explain the Supreme Court's
generally pro-plaintiff stance in the FELA cases. The Court showed little or no concern
with making the state forum fair for defendants, but instead regularly enhanced the de-
sirability of the state court for plaintiffs. In addition, as I noted above, see text accompa-
nying notes 120-41 supra, I doubt that the difference in removal power is significant
because I doubt that it is purposeful. Defendants' ability to remove to federal court
might justify a lesser imposition of federal law on the state courts, but I am unwilling to
place much weight. on a distinction I think should be eliminated.
210 For the text of this statute, see text accompanying note 86 supra.
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sion, including changes in substantive tort law,211 and, according
to the Court, a right to jury trial with federal accoutrements212
and federal damages law.21" Thus, the Court might well have
concluded that Congress's goals were to be served by lending the
state courts federal law generous to FELA plaintiffs, even if the
loan were compulsory, and thereby sparing the federal courts
the burden of this tort litigation.21 Although the FELA and sec-
tion 1983 share a pro-plaintiff orientation, they differ in the
need for uniformity represented, and in the significance of the
role of federal law as opposed to merely a federal forum. The
Court's willingness to impose federal procedure on the state
courts in the FELA cases is telling but is also tied to the statute
being interpreted.
2. The Diversity Cases
The idea that the state court's choice between using federal
or state collateral law in adjudicating a federal law claim is sim-
ply the mirror image of the decisions federal courts must make
in diversity cases has proved intriguing to commentators and
Supreme Court justices alike.21 5 On the basis of this analogy, it
is suggested that the determinations made in the diversity cases
about when the law of the forum should apply may simply be
borrowed and applied to state court section 1983 actions. 16
Certainly the issue of choice of law in diversity cases has
much in common with the choice of law issue here - there is a
choice between federal and state collateral law, the forum state
21 See notes 184-85 supra. See 56 CONG. REC. 4041, 4044, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1910); 52 CONG. REC. 4601 (1906) (statement of Rep. Sterling).
22 See text accompanying notes 196-99 supra.
23 See cases cited in notes 202 & 204 supra.
24 The absence of a statute like section 1988 also means that to the extent federal/
state uniformity of procedure was deemed desirable (perhaps for the purpose of encour-
aging FELA plaintiffs to frequent state court), it could only be achieved by imposing
federal law on the state courts, as state law would not be used in the federal courts.
21' The first commentary proposing this analysis seems to have been Hill, Substance
and Procedure in State FELA Actions - The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO
ST. L.J. 384 (1956). See also Neuborne, supra note 4, at 766-77; Note, supra note 72, at
759-62; Note, State Enforcement, supra note 5, at 1557-61.
For judicial fans of the doctrine, see Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 301 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2313 (1988) (Brennan,J.).
216 See Neuborne, supra note 4, at 780-86 (applying the diversity case results as part
of a general cross-forum law).
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is applying the substantive law of the other jurisdiction, and
there is probably no way to make a choice except by balancing
the interests involved.21 Beyond these observations, however,
the analogy to the diversity cases is no more helpful than the
analogy to the FELA cases.218 Just because the Supreme Court
decided in a diversity case that the law of the forum governs the
allocation of function between judge and jury,219 for example,
does not necessarily mean that the law of the forum should gov-
ern that issue in state court section 1983 actions.
First, the key question is once again congressional intent.
The system of statutes applicable in the two contexts is obvi-
ously different. With respect to choice of law decisions pertain-
ing to state court, the Rules Enabling Act,220 the Rules of Deci-
sion Act,221  and even section 1988 do not apply. The
constitutional questions that loom in the background of Con-
gress's hypothesized attempt to use federal procedure are quite
different. The constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction 2 2
does not apply; the fourteenth amendment does. The tenth
amendment,223 or whatever is deemed to be the constitutional
issue lurking in Erie,224 does not apply; the supremacy clause
217 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
218 This analogy may in fact be less helpful because of the nature of the law in the
diversity cases. The Erie line of cases has passed through a number of metamorphoses,
focusing first on substance and procedure, see Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92
(1938) (Reed, J., concurring), then on the impact of the rule in question on the outcome
of the case, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), then on a balancing of
the forum state's interest in its procedure with the generative state's interest in the out-
come of the proceeding, see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958).
"Erie" questions must be analyzed differently depending on the context of relevant
statutory law, see Ely, supra note 145, at 697-98. Some "Erie" questions, like the ques-
tion of the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure posed in Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965), implicate fairly specific congressional statements about which law to
apply, see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); while others involve different
statutory schemes or policies, see Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1982), dis-
cussed in Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-73. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any general rule from
"the diversity cases" at all. Cf. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 123, §
4511, at 175 (there is no workable diversity rule in cases not involving the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
219 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
220 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
221 Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 725.
222 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
222 See note 194 supra.
224 Erie has been said to have an "unmistakable, if only vaguely definable aspect of
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does. In either context, there is a question of Congress's power,
but in the one case, the issue is of power to impose federal pro-
cedure on state law claims, simply because a federal forum is
hearing those claims; in the other, the issue is the power to force
federal procedure on the state courts hearing a federal claim.
The comity issues that troubled the Court in the Erie cases
and that would lead to a hesitancy to apply the forum's proce-
dural law cut the other way here. Comity considerations would
lead to a hesitancy not to apply the forum's procedural law.
Also, as noted above, the forum-shopping concerns that domi-
nate the later Erie cases 225 diminish when a defendant can re-
move the proceeding to the court of the generative forum.
The principal purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide
a disinterested forum for out-of-state plaintiffs who fear bias in
the defendants' state courts. 226 The desire to be fair to those
plaintiffs is at war with the principles of federalism. The most
practical compromise is to offer plaintiffs a federal forum, but
not to attempt to make that forum particularly attractive or
even different. The federal courts are disinterested and should
not desire to lure diversity plaintiffs. State courts hearing sec-
tion 1983 actions, on the other hand, are not disinterested. The
behavior of officials of that state is at issue, so state court judges
may be perceived as having a greater stake in the outcome of the
case.227 At the same time, the state courts may wish to attract
civil rights litigants so as to avoid the intrusion of federal judges
the constitutional about it." Ely, supra note 144, at 696. Ely does not believe that the
tenth amendment is at issue, but rather the lack of constitutional power for Congress to
make substantive law in diversity cases. Id. at 700-06. See Friendly, supra note 144, at
384-85 (stressing the significance of the constitutional underpinnings of Erie).
2' See note 161 and text accompanying notes 207-08 supra.
2 See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 123, § 3601, at 337-38 (James
Madison's assertion that diversity jurisdiction was created for this reason is the tradi-
tional and most often cited explanation); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 139-52 (1973); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L.
REv. 483 (1928); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948). This theory would explain why defendants
are permitted to remove a diversity case to federal court only if they are not citizens of
the forum state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
For a rejection of the traditional view, see R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 141-43
(1985) (local bias played smaller role in creation of diversity jurisdiction than generally
assumed and is not a major motivating factor for lawyers bringing diversity cases to
federal court).
221 See note 125 supra.
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into state affairs.
The state's interest in retaining its own procedure in section
1983 cases is also strengthened by the fact that there is such
extensive overlap between civil rights causes of action and other
state causes of action, such as torts. If a state procedure is used
in federal court in a diversity case, it is unlikely to have much
impact on the remainder of the federal docket;228 if a federal
procedure is used in state court, the impact on the course of the
litigation as well as on comity might well be greater.
Furthermore, the message of the diversity cases is inconsis-
tent with the FELA cases. Although the goal of the Erie cases
originally seemed to be a maximization of the federal courts' use
of the law of the generative jurisdiction,229 the Court has been
interpreting the various statutes involved as reflecting a congres-
sional intent that results in a fairly expansive use of the law of
the forum. 230 Despite the purported concerns for comity, the Su-
preme Court's diversity cases place a high value on the practical
need for the federal forum to follow its own procedural law. This
position is in marked contrast with the Court's assessment in
the FELA cases of the significance of the state court's interest in
following its own procedural law. For example, contrast the deci-
sion in Dice that a state court adjudicating an FELA claim must
follow federal law - the law of the generative jurisdiction - on
allocation of function between judge and jury with the holding
of Byrd that a federal court in a diversity case should follow
federal law - the law of the forum jurisdiction - on essentially
the same issue.23' In my view, these cases are not necessarily in-
228 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not keep records of
the number of diversity jurisdiction cases that also raise federal questions. Telephone
interview with Pamela Crawford, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Sta-
tistical Analysis and Reports Division (March 9, 1989). The fact that of the thirty-five
civil opinions written by the Second Circuit in January 1988, there were no cases brought
on both grounds is some slight evidence supporting my intuition that the overlap of
diversity and federal question cases is not great. The research on this point is available
in the files of Brooklyn Law Review.
22 See note 144 supra; Neuborne, supra note 4, at 776-77.
230 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Professor Currie has criticized
the Court for placing a higher value on the federal court's interest in following its own
procedural rules, as in Byrd, 356 U.S. 525, in which the Court decided that the federal or
forum court rule on allocation of function between judge and jury should be applied,
than on the state court's interest in following its own procedure, as in the FELA cases.
See D. CURRIE, supra note 153, at 526.
231 Of course, the Byrd case, litigated in federal court, did implicate the seventh
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consistent. They are simply interpreting, rightly or wrongly, two
different statutory and constitutional contexts. The distance be-
tween Byrd and Dice shows the futility of trying to swallow
whole the conclusion of another line of cases, and also the im-
possibility of melding the FELA cases and the diversity cases
together as a model for section 1983 decision making.
The Erie cases, like the FELA cases, are interesting and in-
structive experiences with similar problems, but do not provide
any simple answers. In sum, there is simply no substitute for a
careful balancing of the state and federal interests involved on a
case-by-case basis, an exercise the next section will attempt.
III. GETTING DOWN TO CASES
Previous sections discussed the extent to which Congress or
the Supreme Court should impose federal collateral law on the
state courts in section 1983 actions. This section will consider
the perspective of state court judges, who have a freer choice in
evaluating the same concerns. Just as Congress can decline to
exercise its presumed power to compel the state courts to adopt
federal collateral law, the state courts or legislatures are free to
borrow as much federal collateral law as they wish, at least
where that federal law would benefit civil rights plaintiffs.23
It is easy to conclude that if disparate state collateral law
benefits plaintiffs, the state courts are free to use that law.33
The federal interest in serving the goals of section 1983 and the
state's interest in following its own procedure coalesce, with only
the previously discredited interest in uniformity on the other
side of the scales. 34 The problem arises when neutral state col-
amendment right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This fact partly explains
why the Court reached its result. But the difference in context underscores my point that
cross-forum choice of law cannot be homogenized.
232 See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2308 (1988).
233 The states that have considered this issue have had no difficulty reaching this
conclusion. See, e.g., Langford v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 21, 37 n.6, 729 P.2d 822, 833
n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398 n.6 (1987) (Bird, C.J., concurring); Suffolk Hous. Serv. v.
Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 87, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 309 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty.
1977), aff'd as modified, 63 A.D.2d 731, 405 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't 1978), aff'd, 70
N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987); South Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P.
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 337, 456 A.2d 390, 483 (1983); White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 763-65, 533 P.2d 222, 226-27, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98-99 (1975); Stocks v.
City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 532, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724, 731 (4th Dist. 1981).
3I In fact, I will argue that the balance of interests is so clear that the Supreme
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lateral law is less favorable to plaintiffs, and the state courts
view a legitimate state interest in using accustomed procedure as
strong enough to warrant using the state law anyway.
State court judges can prevent such crises from arising by
selecting procedures that will make state court at least as hospi-
table a forum for civil rights litigants as federal court.2 35 This
posture will better serve the state's interests in the long run be-
cause if state courts become plaintiffs' primary choice for con-
ducting civil rights litigation, the friction of federal court inter-
vention into state affairs will be eased. However, if a state
procedure is neutral, not inconsistent with the goals of section
1983236 and serves a strong enough legitimate state interest that
the state courts wish to insist on its application, allowing the
state courts to apply a procedure plaintiffs might dislike may be
simply the other side of the coin of allowing state court
generosity.
A. Differences in Federal/State Justiciability Doctrine
When the state collateral law at issue is a justiciability doc-
trine, which will generally be easily categorized as favoring or
disfavoring plaintiffs, application of these principles is fairly
simple. If a state wishes to confer standing on a plaintiff the
federal courts would not have heard, it should certainly be al-
lowed to do so; if it wishes to deny standing to a plaintiff the
federal courts would have heard, the state's doctrine is likely to
be inconsistent with federal law. There are also several excep-
tional situations that deserve comment. May a state follow its
own generous justiciability doctrine if it would then be rendering
a decision not subject to review by the Supreme Court? On the
other hand, may a state apply an unfavorable justiciability doc-
trine in a case in which a federal forum would have been un-
available for other reasons?
Court should leave room in its interpretation of the scope of section 1983 for the states
to use more generous doctrine and perhaps even allow the states to be more generous
concerning the definition of section 1983 itself. See text accompanying notes 252-54
infra.
235 See, e.g., Bach v. County of Butte, 147 Cal. App. 3d 554, 562-63, 195 Cal. Rptr.
268, 272-73 (3d Dist. 1983) (assuming that applying federal law on construction of plead-
ings will be consistent with section 1983 and playing it safe by doing so).
23' How broadly these goals should be defined was discussed at text accompanying
notes 145-48 supra.
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1. State Doctrine Tending to Benefit Plaintiffs
a. Collateral Law
Only a fanatical advocate of intrastate uniformity would
suggest that the state courts should follow all of the collateral
restrictions applicable to federal courts in section 1983 litigation.
By their very terms, constitutional provisions like article III's
case or controversy requirement 3 7 or the eleventh amendment 28
apply only to the federal courts.2 39 Limitations derived from
these provisions, like the restrictions on the availability of fed-
eral injunctive relief declared in Pennhurst State School & Hos-
240 os T 2411pital v. Halderman,2 0 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, or
the standing restrictions of Warth v. Seldin,242 therefore need
not apply in state court.24 3 Neither should restrictions on federal
injunctive relief based on prudential concerns of federalism and
comity that, like the eleventh amendment, are simply inapplica-
ble in state court.244 The only basis for arguing that state courts
137 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
28 See note 168 supra.
2" The eleventh amendment is not applicable to the states. See Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890) (interpreting eleventh amendment as applying only to suits against a
state in federal court). For a historical discussion of the eleventh amendments applica-
tion, see Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983).
240 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (The eleventh amendment bars a federal court from issuing
certain injunctive relief against state officials, regardless of whether on a federal or a
pendent state claim.).
241 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (plaintiff who had been subjected to a police chokehold, pur-
suant to an avowed city policy, had no standing to enjoin a continuation of this practice
because he could not demonstrate sufficient likelihood that he personally would be sub-
jected to a chokehold in the future).
242 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (finding an impressive array of potential plaintiffs to have no
standing).
243 See Stocks v. City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 527, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728
(4th Dist. 1981) (describing the constitutional and prudential standing limitations delin-
eated in Warth as responding to concerns "peculiarly federal in nature" (quoting Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8 (1977)). Accord Suffolk
Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 87, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 309 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk Cty. 1977), aff'd as modified, 63 A.D.2d 731, 405 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't 1978),
aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987); Urban League v. Township
of Mahwah, 147 N.J. Super. 28, 33, 370 A.2d 521, 524, certif. denied, 74 N.J. 278, 377
A.2d 682 (1977). See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1400-01 (1978) (state
courts unaffected by Warth standing doctrine, at least with respect to state claims).
2, One example of a federal restraining doctrine that should be inapplicable in state
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should follow these federal principles would be the urge for uni-
formity. But even the argument for uniformity is undercut
where a federal forum is unavailable, because disparate results
in identical cases are as impossible in this situation as forum
shopping. In contexts, like Felder, in which state courts are re-
quired to adopt more generous federal law, the compulsory uni-
formity serves federalism in one way by ensuring that the state
courts will continue to attract a fair share of civil rights litiga-
tion, even as it disserves another conception of a federalist
model by preventing the states from employing their usual pro-
cedures. To prevent a state from using its own more generous
collateral law would not serve any purpose.
What if a state court does not wish to afford the benefit of a
more generous state justiciability doctrine to section 1983 plain-
tiffs? One New Jersey court, for example, seemed to suggest that
its state's generous standing doctrine in exclusionary zoning
cases might be available in claims under the state but not the
federal Constitution. 45 I think this is another example of the
well-intentioned but misguided striving for uniformity with fed-
eral court, even in an instance where plaintiffs would benefit
from disparate treatment. There is no reason, uniformity aside,
for a state court adjudicating federal claims to adopt a limiting
justiciability doctrine that arose out of the federal courts' con-
cern with their proper role in a federalist system. If the state
shared the federal courts' concerns - perhaps as a matter of
court is the equitable restraint doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In
Younger, the Court declined to enjoin a state criminal statute that allegedly chilled
rights of free speech and press. The decision rests on a strong policy against federal
courts interfering with state court proceedings - a policy based on considerations of
comity and federalism, see id. at 43-49. Therefore, if a state court wishes to enjoin a
pending state criminal prosecution, it should not be considered barred from doing so
(unless, perhaps, the state court has a parallel policy of its own, see text accompanying
notes 267-88 infra).
However, if the Court were to recast Younger v. Harris as an interpretation of the
remedies provided by section 1983, the doctrine would be binding on the state courts and
prohibit such injunctions.
Professor Steinglass notes that the plaintiff-benefitting aspects of a doctrine like
Younger v. Harris should apply to state court judges so that the federal principle acts as
a floor. See S. STEINGLASS, supra note 4, at 18-7-8. For example, a state court could not
refuse to enjoin a pending criminal prosecution the federal courts would have been per-
mitted to enjoin under the bad faith exception. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802
(1974) (bad faith as exception to Younger v. Harris equitable restraint doctrine).
24'5 See Urban League v. Township of Mahwah, 147 N.J. Super. 28, 33, 370 A.2d 521,
524, certif. denied, 74 N.J. 278, 377 A.2d 682 (1977).
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state separation of powers principles - presumably its jus-
ticiability doctrine would not be so generous to plaintiffs, and
there would be little choice to make.246
In fact, there is some basis for arguing that not only may
the state court apply its own more generous doctrine, but it
must. Failure to do so might be considered discrimination
against a plaintiff with a federal claim. If the state courts must
worry that by failing to apply federal collateral rules in section
1983 actions they might run afoul of the supremacy clause, the
antidiscrimination doctrine is a constitutional Charybdis. An old
line of cases establishes, presumably also on the authority of the
supremacy clause, that a state court may not refuse to hear a
federal cause of action when it has jurisdiction over analogous
causes of action. 47 If a state court may not be less generous to
plaintiffs with federal claims than to those with state claims,
should this principle extend to prohibit a state court from deny-
ing federal statutory litigants the benefit of procedures it would
afford litigants with a state cause of action? Under this theory,
246 A state court might in the past have chosen to follow federal justiciability law
because to do so would serve a number of interests. Federal law was generally more
favorable to civil rights litigants and, thus, served the goals of section 1983; federal law
was a safe choice for a state court not wishing to be overruled, and following federal
justiciability law eliminated the necessity of parsing the substantive and procedural as-
pects of section 1983 actions. Now that federal law is becoming more restrictive, state
courts have to choose among these goals. In Wisconsin, for example, the courts have been
using federal justiciability doctrine despite the inapplicability of article III to the state
courts on the theory that "our application of the federal law of standing insures that
federal claims raised in Wisconsin can be fully litigated." State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank
v. M. & I Peoples Bank, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308 n.5, 290 N.W.2d 321, 325 n.5 (1980). Wis-
consin courts have a policy that the law of standing is not to be construed narrowly or
restrictively. See Fox v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 112 Wis. 2d 514, 518,
334 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1983). But in the same case describing these goals, Wisconsin bor-
rowed the restrictive standing doctrine of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983), see text accompanying notes 256-57 infra. The Wisconsin courts have not yet
undertaken to choose among the conflicting desires to follow federal law, and to apply
generous standing doctrine to federal rights plaintiffs. Gordon and Gross, supra note 5,
who argue that the state courts must hear section 1983 actions despite state justiciability
doctrines, and despite any lack of jurisdiction to hear those cases, assume that federal
justiciability standards will be more generous, id. at 1180, and do not discuss whether
states must give civil rights plaintiffs the benefit of favorable state law.
2'7 See Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1912)
(state courts may not refuse to entertain FELA claims when their jurisdiction extends to
analogous state law claims); Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S.
377, 388 (1929) (state court refusal to exercise jurisdiction over FELA claims must be
based on a valid excuse); McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230
(1934); Neuborne, supra note 4, at 753-59.
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once it is determined that a particular doctrine, such as a stand-
ing doctrine, is not part of the substance of section 1983, the
state courts would be required to apply their usual doctrine, at
least where that doctrine is more favorable to section 1983 plain-
tiffs than federal law would be.
While I doubt that the Court would extend the antidis-
crimination doctrine to compel state courts to afford civil rights
plaintiffs the benefit of more generous state justiciability princi-
ples, 4" the state courts nevertheless should be wary of such dis-
crimination and should offer their own more generous collateral
law to federal claim plaintiffs rather than pursue a foolish con-
sistency with federal court.
b. Noncollateral Law
The foregoing discussion has focused on doctrines, like
standing, presumed to be extrinsic to section 1983 and, there-
fore, offering the state courts room to maneuver. The Supreme
Court has posited that once federal common law has been cre-
ated in a given area, the states may be neither more nor less
generous than federal law provides. This was the explanation, in
Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan,4 9 for refusing to al-
low a state court to afford an FELA plaintiff prejudgment inter-
est on a damages claim. If a state court hearing a section 1983
action wished to award prejudgment interest, the existence of
federal common law on damages under section 1983 presumably
would stymie that generous impulse also. 5'
The more expansively the Court interprets section 1983 and
its concomitant common law, the less opportunity the state
courts have to afford civil rights plaintiffs the benefit of advan-
tageous state law. Even doctrines now considered collateral, like
standing, might be federalized if the Court were to decide to in-
terpret the availability of injunctive relief, for example, as being
a matter of "statutory interpretation" of section 1983. Lyons, for
example, could be characterized as a restriction on the availabil-
218 As Professor Meltzer points out, even the precise constitutional origins of the
antidiscrimination doctrine are unclear. Meltzer, supra note 85, at 1161-64.
219 Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 108 S. Ct. 1837 (1988). See text ac-
companying note 204 supra.
250 The law of damages is considered to be part of the federal common law created
under section 1983. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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ity of injunctive relief rather than as a doctrine derived from
article III or prudential concerns only applicable in federal
court.251 The nationalized doctrine would then bind the state
courts. This situation is undesirable because the interests of
both the state courts and civil rights plaintiffs are disserved.
There are two approaches the Court might take to avoid
glorifying uniformity above all other interests. First, the Court
could exercise restraint in "interpreting" section 1983 and make
more liberal use of section 1988's direction to use hospitable
state law in federal court section 1983 actions. This would leave
space for the state courts to create plaintiff oriented law con-
cerning justiciability and remedies. Decisions restraining state
court generosity could be narrowly construed. Further, decisions
resting on uniquely federal considerations could be restricted in
their applicability to federal court section 1983 actions. The
cases creating a federal common law of damages and immunities
were, for the most part, decided in the context of federal court
section 1983 actions, where providing a uniform federal common
law is less intrusive and more desirable than in the context of
state court. These cases might be distinguished in the state
court context.
The other possible solution is truly radical. The state courts
could be given license to apply even the "substance" of section
1983 in any way at least as generous to plaintiffs as federal doc-
trine. The state courts would then be permitted to use a more
generous damages rule, immunity doctrine, or statute of limita-
tions, and perhaps even to expand the scope of section 1983 by
entertaining actions based on a theory of respondeat superior,252
or permitting suits against entities not considered "persons"
under section 1983. Professor Sager has proposed that state
2", 461 U.S. 95 (1983). See notes 268-69 and accompanying text infra. The same
might be true of other federal court restrictions on the availability of injunctive relief,
like the Younger v. Harris equitable restraint doctrine, see note 244 supra.
2I This doctrine is considered inapplicable to section 1983 cases, see Monell v.
Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973) (prohibiting federal court from using section 1988 to borrow state statute provid-
ing for vicarious liability of county on the ground that such statute was inconsistent with
federal law).
Moor, dealing with the power of a federal court to use section 1988 to expand upon
section 1983, does not necessarily answer the question of whether a state court might use
its own statute to impose vicarious liability, although it certainly suggests what the
Court's attitude toward this question would be. See note 12 supra.
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courts be permitted to be more generous in interpreting federal
constitutional provisions underenforced by the federal courts.253
The same proposal could be applied to section 1983, as an un-
derenforced federal statute.254
This is not a proposal the Supreme Court is likely to adopt.
Awareness of the problems created by blanket federal rules,
however, should lead the Court to consider carefully whether
there really is a need to federalize any more of the collateral law
surrounding section 1983 litigation, and whether it would indeed
be desirable to federalize less.
2. Article III and Supreme Court Review
If the state courts do hear cases the federal courts would be
unable to hear, however broadly that power is defined, an addi-
tional problem is posed if the state courts hear a case deemed
not to present a case or controversy under article III. This was
ostensibly the case with the standing doctrine of City of Los An-
geles v. Lyons."5 Should a state court be free to reject the re-
strictive views of Lyons256 despite the fact that its decision
253 See Sager, supra note 113. The basis for this proposal is that the federal courts'
restrictive interpretations of federal constitutional rights sometimes derive from modest
notions of the proper role of federal courts. The state courts, free from these restrictions,
are in a better position to enforce constitutional guarantees fully.
21 This theory could be limited to situations in which the federal courts' restrictive
views are in fact based on uniquely federal concerns, and not applied to decisions consid-
ered to derive from an interpretation of congressional intent, such as who is a "person"
within the meaning of section 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
"8 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983). See note 241 supra.
256 In Lyons, Justice White invited the state courts to reject the federal limitations
imposed in that case. ("Beyond these considerations the state courts need not impose the
same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal court proceedings. The indi-
vidual states may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law
enforcement authorities on a continuing basis.") Id. at 113. California has responded to
Justice White's invitation. See Langford v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 21, 37 n.6, 729
P.2d 822, 833 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398 n.6, cert. denied sub nom., Gates v. Langford,
108 S. Ct. 87 (1987) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs who had suffered from
city police department's use of motorized battering rams, enjoining future use of this
practice, without discussing whether plaintiffs had made the showing required under Ly-
ons of a likelihood that they would suffer from this police practice in the future).
In White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 763-65, 533 P.2d 222, 225-27, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975) (en banc), the California Supreme Court in this pre-Lyons case allowed plaintiffs
standing as taxpayers to challenge police surveillance practices. In Langford, a post-Ly-
ons case, 43 Cal. 3d at 32, 729 P.2d at 830, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 395, the court reiterated that
taxpayer standing to challenge police practices is available and provides another route
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would be unreviewable by the Supreme Court?257
The Supreme Court has been unwilling to review cases not
presenting a case or controversy, but also has been unwilling to
vacate state court decisions in such cases simply because of the
unavailability of Supreme Court review.
In Doremus v. Board of Education,25" a state taxpayer was
initially granted standing in state court to challenge a state stat-
ute providing for Bible reading in the schools. The Supreme
Court declared itself unable to review the case in light of its pre-
vious determination that such taxpayer standing is insufficient
to satisfy article 111.259 The Court then dismissed the appeal, re-
marking, "We do not undertake to say that a state court may
not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even
under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as
advisory. '260
around the restrictions of Lyons.
257 It might be argued that the Supreme Court should be permitted to review a case
properly considered in the state courts. This argument might be based on a theory that
the limitation article III imposes on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is narrower than
the limitation imposed on the district courts because the Supreme Court reviews the
actions of state courts which have already fully developed a record and intensified the
adversary nature of the proceeding. Justice Stevens, at least, has suggested that standing
issues should be analyzed differently depending upon whether the question is one of
standing in the Supreme Court or in the lower courts. Secretary of State of Maryland v.
J. H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 970-72 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). His conclusion,
however, is that the Supreme Court has no more power to review a state court decision
on an issue in which the requirements of article III have not been met than a district
court would to entertain such a claim initially. Id. Stevens's colleagues on the Court also
have adopted the position that the case or controversy requirement precludes such re-
view. See Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (1976);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
(1952). This is certainly not an untenable interpretation of article I, and also is not one
the Court is likely to modify.
258 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
259 Id. at 434-35. See also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (status as
federal taxpayer insufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff who wishes to challenge a
federal statute).
260 342 U.S. at 434. On the other hand, in the later case of DeFunis, the Court va-
cated a state court decision found to be moot under article III, despite the fact that
under state law the case was saved from mootness by the great public interest in the
continuing issues present in the case. See 416 U.S. at 316. It is probably reading too
much into the Court's different handling of these cases to suggest that the vacatur in
DeFunis makes the suggestion the Court declined to make in Doremus. Members of the
Court seem to assume that the principle stated in Doremus is still law. See Bateman v.
Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1305 (Rehnquist, Circuit J.) (1976) ("The courts of a State are
free to follow their own jurisprudence as to who may raise a federal constitutional ques-
tion, but this Court in reviewing a state-court judgment is bound by the requirements of
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I think that the Court was right in Doremus and that there
is no good reason for resolving that a state court cannot hear a
federal claim simply because the Supreme Court will be unable
to review it. Why should there not be "advisory" state court
opinions about the constitutionality of a Bible reading statute,
or of an affirmative action program in that state? Uniformity of
state court results with federal court results is not, for the rea-
sons already described, a good reason to impose the limitations
of article III on the state courts.
A state's highest court already has the final word in inter-
preting the provisions of its own constitution.26' Because of the
adequate state ground doctrine, these state constitutional rul-
ings are not subject to Supreme Court review. Why should the
lack of availability of Supreme Court review of similar cases for
a different reason - article III - prevent the state courts from
rendering advisory opinions to the officials of its own state as to
what the federal Constitution would require in circumstances
the federal courts would have difficulty considering?
If states were permitted to hear section 1983 claims unre-
viewable under article III, it is unlikely that the power would be
abused. Section 1983 was created precisely because most states
were perceived as being unreceptive to civil rights claims. Com-
mentators are still deploring restrictive state justiciability doc-
trine and its impact on federal civil rights litigation.2 62 The state
court would have the opportunity to render an unreviewable
federal constitutional decision only if the state's usual jus-
ticiability doctrine were more beneficial to plaintiffs than federal
doctrine. A state adventurous enough to have created a generous
case and controversy and standing associated with Art. I1 of the United States Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Education . . ... "). See also Secretary of State of
Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 971-73 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (if
article III is not satisfied, the Supreme Court should deny certiorari and let the state
court decision stand).
21 This is because of the adequate and independent state ground theory, under
which Supreme Court jurisdiction is barred. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Long demonstrates the Supreme Court's suspicion of allowing the states final say on any
constitutional law issue, state or federal. The Court in Long threatens to reach out to
overrule any constitutional ruling not explicitly based on the state constitution. See id.
at 1040 ("[A]n important need for uniformity in federal law . . . goes unsatisfied when
we fail to review [a state court] opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds and
where independence of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of
the opinion.").
262 See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 5, at 1177-81.
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standing doctrine would, in all likelihood, have reached a similar
result on the basis of a state law claim."' Is it likely that permit-
ting New Jersey courts hearing section 1983 exclusionary zoning
cases to utilize a broader theory of standing than Warth, or Cal-
ifornia courts hearing police misconduct cases to entertain a
claim for injunctive relief that would be barred by Lyons, would
significantly change the law in those jurisdictions? The potential
defendants are not likely to be affected, and the prospective
plaintiffs will be encouraged to bring their actions in state rather
than federal court.
2. State Court Doctrine Tending to Disadvantage
Plaintiffs
In the previous section, benefits to civil rights plaintiffs
lined up with the state's interest in the integrity of its own pro-
cedures and other interests to present a very strong case for per-
mitting a state to use its own generous justiciability doctrine in
section 1983 actions. But what if state justiciability doctrine is
different in a way that disadvantages plaintiffs?
a. Preclusive Justiciability Doctrine
If a state's unique justiciability doctrine prevents a state
court section 1983 plaintiff from bringing a case the federal
courts would have heard - if the state has a special standing
requirement, or a restrictive mootness doctrine, for example264
- it might be said, as the Court suggested in Felder,26 that the
doctrine is "outcome-determinative," imposes an inordinate bur-
den on federal rights and may not be used. This is a relatively
easy rule when applied to justiciability doctrines, which will
tend to be outcome-determinative, and is probably preferable
because of its predictability. But there could be room to reach
different conclusions on a case-by-case basis.
213 This was the case in White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 764, 765 n.3, 533 P.2d at 227,
228 n.3, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99, 100 n.3, as discussed at note 256 supra.
264 Happily, it is difficult to find examples of state courts applying restrictive jus-
ticiability doctrines in section 1983 actions. Before Felder, some state courts rejected
plaintiffs who had not exhausted their state administrative remedies. See note 272 infra.
But this practice is now prohibited, subject to some possible exceptions, see text accom-
panying notes 273-87 infra.
I5 See 108 S. Ct. at 2308.
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Suppose that a state has a particularly harsh mootness doc-
trine, for example. The Supreme Court has announced that
mootness of a federal question is itself a federal question,288 but
this decisive sounding pronouncement only asserts federal power
to displace state law if necessary to serve federal interests. 267
The question to be asked, as described in the preceding section,
should focus not only on whether the federal right is burdened,
but also on the nature, weight, and legitimacy of the state inter-
est involved. If a state had a strong legitimate interest in its doc-
trine - if, for example, the state had a particular need to keep
moribund cases off its crowded docket and applied this doctrine
equally to state and federal claimants alike 8 - then it could be
said that the doctrine was not an "unnecessary" burden on the
federal right,269 that the state had a "valid excuse, 27 ° or that the
doctrine is not so inconsistent with federal law as to require the
state to forego a neutral procedure, even if it would be outcome-
determinative.
In areas like justiciability in which negative state doctrine is
so likely to be inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983 -
which was enacted on behalf of plaintiffs who had difficulty get-
ting their claims heard in state court - I think a blanket rule is
justifiable. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the
state doctrines falling into this category are uncommon and sub-
ject to the self-restraint of state court judges. The issue-by-issue
balance just described is more appropriately used in the area of
procedure, where it is not always clear whether it is plaintiffs
or defendants who are favored.
216 Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 304 (1964).
217 This could be so either via the adequate state ground doctrine, on the theory
that the state's dismissal of the case is an inadequate ground because it imposes a bur-
den on a federal right, or under an FELA-type theory that Congress intended federal
justiciability law to accompany the federal right being litigated into court.
266 This would be in contrast to the Liner case, 375 U.S. 301, in which the Court
may well have believed that the state court was discriminating against the federal claim
at stake. See text accompanying note 247 supra.
269 See text accompanying note 193 supra.
270 See Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
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b. The Unavailable Forum -
Exhaustion and the Tax Cases
The Court's decision in Felder that the outcome-determina-
tive requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies
may not be applied in a state court section 1983 action2"1 was
simply an extension of a prohibition previously applied in the
federal courts. According to the Court, Congress had more or
less explicitly viewed an exhaustion requirement as repugnant to
the goals of section 1983.272 The state courts were required to
make themselves no less readily available than the federal
courts.
There are circumstances, however, in which the federal
courts are permitted to impose various doctrines remitting
would-be federal court section 1983 plaintiffs to state judicial
remedies. One good example of this situation arises in federal
court section 1983 litigation involving the constitutionality of
state tax decisions;273 another is state prisoner challenges to the
length or fact of custody.27 4 May a state court impose an exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies requirement, despite Felder, in a
case in which the federal courts are permitted to impose a judi-
cial exhaustion rule? Is it the goal of state courts to replicate
federal court, even in its unavailability, or to open its doors to
civil rights plaintiffs precisely because the federal courts are
unavailable?
There are compelling reasons why the state courts have be-
271 See 108 S. Ct. at 2308.
222 Before Felder was decided, some state courts had concluded that the Court's
decision in Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), that exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies could not be required in federal court section 1983 actions, would
not apply in state court. See, e.g., Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis. 2d 404, 383 N.W.2d 54,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 323
S.E.2d 381 (1984), rev. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 392 (1985). See Note, supra
note 47, at 1042-43 (state court reaction to Patsy varied, but most state court opinions
did not sufficiently analyze the applicability of Patsy to their decisions whether to apply
an exhaustion requirement).
Most state courts imposing an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
on section 1983 plaintiffs have done so in the context of tax cases, which present a some-
what different situation. See text accompanying notes 275-87 infra.
2173 See text accompanying notes 279-87 infra.
274 See text accompanying note 288 infra.
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come the primary forum for constitutional challenges to a state
or local government's system of taxation. 5 Congress, showing a
particularly strong concern for comity when a state's finances
are involved, prohibited federal courts from enjoining a state's
collection of its taxes "where a plain, speedy and efficient rem-
edy may be had in the courts of such State. 27 6 In Fair Assess-
ment in Real Estate v. McNary, 7 the Supreme Court then
held, on the basis of similar comity concerns, that plaintiffs
seeking damages should also be precluded from a federal forum
if the state provided adequate remedies.27 8 Thus, the federal
courts will not consider a constitutional challenge to a state tax
system or decision in a section 1983 action, but only the ade-
quacy of existing state remedies." 9
In many jurisdictions, plaintiffs wishing to challenge the
constitutionality of a particular tax system arrive in state court
only to be confronted with the state's requirement that they ex-
haust administrative remedies.280 It seems clear that the tax
anti-injunction act should not be held to bar injunctions issued
in section 1983 taxapayer actions in state court,281 and that Mc-
271 For a general discussion of the phenomenon of taxpayer state court section 1983
tax cases, see Note, State Taxation, supra note 5.
276 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
277 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
278 Id. Four justices in dissent deplored this judicially created exception to section
1983 jurisdiction. Id. at 117.
217 This restriction parallels the Court's treatment of due process claims under Par-
ratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), see note 78 supra; and of habeas corpus claims based
on the fourth amendment under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
280 See, e.g., Stufflebaum v. Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1985) (en banc);
Raschke v. Blancher, 141 IMI. App. 3d 813, 491 N.E.2d 1171 (3d Dist. 1986); Johnston v.
Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707, 323 S.E.2d 381 (1984), rev. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
S.E.2d 392 (1985). Some courts have not applied state exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies requirements. See Beverly Bank v. Board of Review, 117 Ill. App. 3d 656, 453
N.E.2d 96, 99 (3d Dist. 1983) (state conceded requirement inapplicable under Patsy),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
Other courts have reached the same result as the courts imposing an exhaustion
requirement, but on the theory that a tax assessment that has not been administratively
appealed is not "final," see, e.g., Cook County Treasurer v. Rosewell, 124 Ill. App. 3d
797, 465 N.E.2d 494 (1984), or that injunctive relief is unavailable because adequate rem-
edies at law - namely the tax review procedures - exist. See Zizka v. Water Pollution
Control Auth., 195 Conn. 682, 490 A.2d 509 (1985).
2I Before the decision in McNary, several states had declined to entertain section
1983 actions for injunctive relief in the tax area, reasoning that if the federal courts did
not have to hear such claims under section 1983, neither did the state courts. See State
Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 723 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Redd
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Nary should not be held to bar state court actions for dam-
ages.282 But does Felder prevent a state from applying its ad-
ministrative exhaustion doctrine in this context?
In contrast to the usual situation governed by Felder, the
Supreme Court has already weighed the significance of the avail-
ability of a federal forum for taxpayers under section 1983
against considerations of comity, and found that comity should
prevail. The McNary opinion is cast as resolving a conflict be-
tween the policies of section 1983 and the policies of the tax
anti-injunction act (albeit in a broadened application). If Con-
gress agrees with the Supreme Court's preference for the comity
interests and with the concomitant exception to section 1983 ju-
risdiction, why should a state not be able to create a comparable
exception to the exhaustion doctrine in order to implement its
own similar concerns with the proper balance of power between
state administrative agencies and state courts? Some state
courts have reasoned that if McNary gives federal courts per-
mission to carve out an exception to section 1983 jurisdiction, it
must give similar permission to the state courts.2 83 If Congress
were to become concerned with the lack of an immediately avail-
able forum, it could overrule McNary and make federal court
more available, at least for damages actions, or even go so far as
to amend the tax anti-injunction statute.2""
v. Lambert, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). After McNary, in which Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, noted that the availability of state court section 1983 actions on tax issues
justified the holding, see 454 U.S. at 116-17, it seems clear that state courts may enter-
tain such claims. See Zizka, 195 Conn. at 685, 490 A.2d at 513; Beverly Bank v. Board of
Review, 117 Ill. App. 3d 656, 453 N.E.2d 96 (1983); see also Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore
Owners & Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kootena County, 104 Idaho 590, 661 P.2d 756 (1983). Mc-
Nary does not say they must do so.
82 This is another context, like those discussed in text accompanying notes 239-44
supra, where the reasons underlying the restrictions on federal court are irrelevant in
state court, so striving for uniformity would be inappropriate.
283 See, e.g., Zizka, 195 Conn. at 685, 490 A.2d at 513. ("Although § 1341 does not
operate as a jurisdictional barrier in state courts, it nonetheless points the way to the
proper standard by which state tax challenges should be measured. In a section 1983 suit
seeking relief from the collection of state taxes, we may impose limitations that, like
those of § 1341, inquire into whether the claimants have been afforded a statutory rem-
edy that is 'plain, speedy and efficient.' ").
284 Another reason to allow the states to apply their usual exhaustion requirements
in tax cases is that a decision prohibiting the states from requiring exhaustion would
have little effect on state proceedings, other than perhaps taxing the ingenuity of state
court judges. There are several unobjectionable grounds on which the state courts could
otherwise effectively require exhaustion. If a challenge to a state tax is based on due
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The existence of a general exhaustion doctrine reflects a
state policy concerning state separation of powers or possibly
even a jurisdictional bar.28 5 Given that it is presumably Con-
gress's will that providing a forum for such tax litigation is less
important than federal prudential concerns, I think that a state
would not be unwarranted in taking McNary as permission to
impose a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies
in the tax cases described.86 I do not agree with the Court's con-
clusion in McNary that the tax cases are so unique as to warrant
an exception to section 1983, but since this conclusion has cre-
ated exceptional treatment of these cases in federal court with-
out Congress demurring, the state courts should not have to
shoulder a burden the federal courts have been instructed to de-
cline, at least in the absence of any evidence that this is what
Congress desires, and therefore should not be required to sus-
pend any exhaustion requirement generally applicable to state
cases, regardless of Felder, in the tax cases. 87
process grounds, for example, the state courts might legitimately dismiss the case out-
right on the ground that there has been no due process violation so long as the state
administrative agency stands ready to hear plaintiff's claim. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981). Another reason for deferring section 1983 tax challenges to state admin-
istrative agencies would apply to plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. Injunctions are not
generally available where adequate remedies at law exist, and a state administrative pro-
cess might be considered an adequate remedy at law. See Zizka, 195 Conn. at 686, 490
A.2d at 514. There seems little point to deciding whether an exhaustion requirement
should be allowed in cases where a remittitur to the state agency would occur anyway, as
long as a state agency had the power to change the challenged decision or policy. If this
category includes virtually all claims for injunctive relief, the exhaustion requirement
would only be likely to affect claims for damages. Here, a state court might nevertheless
defer to the agency, not on the grounds of requiring exhaustion, but on the ground that
the state decision is not final and may not be challenged in court, or on the ground of
ripeness.
28' See id.
2'86 At least one state court thought that the Supreme Court gave such permission in
McNary in adopting the language of section 1341 of title 28 of the United States Code
about deferring to state "remedies" instead of referring to state court. If administrative
remedies are adequate, reasoned this court, McNary says they may be pursued. See id.
at 685, 490 A.2d at 513.
287 An exception may, of course, be made to an exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies requirement when exhaustion would be futile or inadequate. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe,
108 S. Ct. 592, 606 (1988). Some jurisdictions that imposed an administrative exhaustion
requirement on section 1983 actions before Patsy, carved out such an exception to the
exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Ray v. Fritz, 468 F.2d 586, 587 (2d Cir. 1972) (exhaus-
tion not required where plaintiff seeks only damages and state agency cannot award
damages); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required in section 1983 actions, but not
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The same reasoning would apply to allow the state courts to
apply an exhaustion requirement in other areas where the fed-
eral courts are effectively permitted to do so. ' s As suggested
when remedy is inadequate or futile). State remedies obviously are not adequate if dam-
ages cannot be granted, and the state courts would be well-advised to follow this doctrine
if an exhaustion requirement were allowed. Whether or not the state courts may be re-
quired to follow this doctrine is another question.
288 In cases brought by prisoners challenging the constitutionality of prison discipli-
nary proceedings, for example, the Court has held that a federal court section 1983 ac-
tion is unavailable as a vehicle for a prisoner to regain good time credit. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Good time credit, permitting a prisoner to be released
from prison at an earlier date, may be taken away as a result of a prison disciplinary
proceeding.
Such claims are held to be in the nature of habeas corpus proceedings and thus must
be exhausted in the state courts. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). If a prisoner takes such a
case to the state court, and the state wishes to impose an administrative exhaustion
requirement of its own, by having the prisoner exhaust an adequate remedy within the
prison administration, for example, the state probably should be allowed to do so.
For a discussion of the applicability of Preiser in state court section 1983 actions,
see S. STEINGLASS, supra note 4, at 18-17-23. Professor Steinglass theorizes that Preiser,
based on comity concerns unique to federal court, might be among the category of doc-
trines inapplicable in state court section 1983 actions, but also speculates that a state
court might be required to apply Preiser if that case is considered as a limitation on the
scope of section 1983. He ultimately agrees with my conclusion that the state courts
should be permitted to apply an exhaustion requirement in Preiser-like cases, as long as
adequate state court remedies are available, although he reaches that conclusion by ap-
plying Preiser itself, rather than looking to the state's accustomed doctrine. In either
event, the adequacy of the available state remedies is plainly significant. The definition
of the exhaustion requirement in habeas cases and of the scope of section 1983 is fully
within Congress's control, and Congress has not questioned this exception to section
1983 either. One limitation on section 1983 adjudication Congress has not only consid-
ered but has created is the abstention provision of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1982). This provision permits a federal court to con-
tinue a prisoner's section 1983 action while the prisoner exhausts effective administrative
remedies (the adequacy of which must be certified by the Attorney General according to
preestablished standards). For a discussion of whether this provision should be consid-
ered applicable to state court section 1983 actions, see S. STEINGLASS, supra note 4, at 17-
12-14. Why should the state not be permitted to pursue some neutral policy that might
restrict section 1983 claims in circumstances in which the federal courts have been per-
mitted to do so?
I do not think that the states should apply an exhaustion requirement simply be-
cause they may. Under Preiser, the Supreme Court creates the possibility that litigation
over the constitutionality of a prison disciplinary proceeding will simultaneously take
place on two fronts - federal court, where damages may be sought, and state court,
where restitution of wrongfully removed good time credit may be ordered. See note 84
supra. Requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies would add a third forum
and truly exhaust the claimant. Allowing the states to use their own doctrine may lead to
some curious results. See Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 880-82 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(Illinois doctrine of prematurity would prevent claimant from having his case heard by
state court, therefore, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply and plaintiff may enter
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earlier, however, the fact that the states have the power to im-
pose limits on section 1983 cases does not mean that they should
do so, any more than the fact that Congress may have power
under the supremacy clause to void those limits means that that
power should be exercised. Discretion is involved in both
instances.
Subject only to a few exceptions, like article III, Congress
may remedy any situation it finds insufficiently receptive to civil
rights - like the holes in section 1983 created by McNary and
Preiser - by making the federal forum more available. This is a
more appropriate first step than flexing the muscles of the
supremacy clause to require the states to do what Congress will
not or cannot require the federal courts to do.
B. Federal/State Disparities in Procedure
While with justiciability doctrine, it is usually clear which of
two different doctrines will favor the plaintiff, with many proce-
dural rules that is not the case. If a state procedure differs from
a federal procedure - if, for example, a state permits a
nonunanimous jury verdict - plaintiff's counsel would need to
be clairvoyant to know before the litigation begins whether that
rule would help or hinder plaintiff's chance of prevailing. Other
procedures may be easier to categorize - liberal class action
rules, for example, or a generous right to a jury trial will gener-
ally be attractive to civil rights plaintiffs, while strict pleading
rules will not. The state should be permitted to apply its own
procedures as long as, balancing the relevant factors, the proce-
dure is not so inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983 as
to warrant an exercise of the supremacy clause.
1. Procedures Favoring Plaintiffs
For the same reasons discussed in connection with jus-
ticiability, if a unique state procedure does favor plaintiffs, there
is no doubt that the state should be permitted to use that proce-
dure in section 1983 litigation. In one FELA case in which the
state had attachment procedures far more attractive to plaintiffs
than federal court procedures, Justice Brandeis had no difficulty
in concluding that the plaintiff should be given the benefit of the
federal court directly on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
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state rule.289 If other state procedures are similarly generous to
plaintiffs - if, for example, the state does not require that a
bond be posted as a prerequisite to injunctive relief 290 - all in-
terests other than uniformity combine on the same side of the
balance.
2. Procedures Disfavoring Plaintiffs
A procedure that is generally and predictably adverse to
plaintiffs might be impermissible. One example, familiar from
the FELA cases, is strict state pleading rules. 29'1 Courts declaring
that it is a federal question whether state pleading rules are so
exacting as to be inconsistent with federal policy 2 92 are correct.
This does not necessarily mean that the conclusion in the FELA
cases rejecting strict local pleading rules should apply to section
1983 cases.293 State courts differ on whether the federal rules on
construing pleadings should apply in this context.294 Are strict
pleading rules so inconsistent with federal interests that they
should be displaced? This depends on the particular rule in-
volved. On some pleading issues, like construction of the plead-
ings, or the relation back of amendments to the complaint,29
"I Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1924).
291 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
291 See text accompanying notes 192-95 supra.
192 See Bach v. County of Butte, 147 Cal. App. 3d 554, 195 Cal. Rptr. 268 (3d Dist.
1983).
293 The context of the FELA cases is distinguishable from section 1983. See text
accompany notes 205-14 supra.
29" Compare Bach v. County of Butte, 147 Cal. App. 3d 554, 195 Cal. Rptr. 268 (3d
Dist. 1983) (prohibiting use of overly exacting state pleading rule) and Greene v. Zank,
158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 204 Cal. Rptr. 770 (2d Dist. 1984) (applying standards of FED. R.
Civ. P. 12 to a motion to dismiss section 1983 complaint) with International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 89 Ill. App. 3d 701, 411 N.E.2d 1030
(1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981) (strict state pleading rules should be enforced in
section 1983 actions).
In Bach, as in Brown, see note 192 supra, the pleading issue had distinctly substan-
tive overtones. The issue in Bach centered on pleading requirements concerning immu-
nity defenses, a matter the Court has held to be part of the substance of section 1983.
See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra. Brown, similarly, involved a pleading question
that implicated what plaintiff would be required to prove. In these instances, there is a
stronger argument for applying federal law than in an instance in which the pleading
issue is purely formal.
29 This has been another area of concern to the state courts. See Willson v. Des
Moines, 386 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 948 (1986) (in which the
federal rule happened to be the same as the state rule); Cooper v. Hutchinson Police
Dep't, 6 Kan. App. 2d 806, 636 P.2d 184 (1981) (amendment found to relate back).
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either party might suffer from state restrictions.2 9
At least as I see the balance of interests on some of these
questions, the particular results reached in the FELA cases and
the Erie cases need not apply here. In contrast to the conclusion
in the diversity cases, the forum's law should, I think, apply on
issues like the relation back of amendments or when a suit is
deemed to have commenced.9 7 These procedures, which do not
generally disadvantage plaintiffs, are not inherently inconsistent
with the purposes of section 1983.95
Some pleading issues are so entwined with the elements of
the case the plaintiff must prove that federal law clearly should
govern.2 9 If the issue is specificity of the pleadings, however, I
think the state should be probably permitted to apply its usual
rules, even though it is predictable that some plaintiffs might be
discomfited by the rule.100 Unlike restrictive standing require-
ments, or a state court's misapprehension over plaintiff's burden
of proof, strict pleading requirements may be overcome by com-
petent counsel,"3 ' and, thus, are not inherently inconsistent with
299 Should it matter whether the plaintiff is actually disfavored in a particular case,
or should the state law be judged in the abstract for its potential inconsistency with
federal interests? This question is similar to the thorny question posed by Henry v. Mis-
sissippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), whether the state's interests in a procedural rule should be
examined on the face of the rule itself, or in the context of alternative methods a state
might have adopted to serve its goals in the particular case. See Meltzer, supra note 85,
at 1181.
For the same reason that I favor a blanket rule prohibiting states from using jus-
ticiability doctrine predictably disfavoring plaintiffs, see text accompanying notes 264-70
supra, I would not follow the case-specific approach of Henry, but would judge the state
procedural rules on their face (as long as the rules are being applied neutrally and do not
discriminate against civil rights plaintiffs).
297 See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(state law governs when action is "commenced" in diversity case); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (reaffirming Ragan after Hanna v. Plumer, see note 218
supra).
298 One interesting example of an arguably disadvantageous procedure is the appli-
cation of state indemnification statutes that provide for the payment of attorney's fees
and damages for public officials who violate the civil rights of citizens. Given that such
statutes would in all likelihood reduce the deterrent effect of section 1983, are such pro-
visions inconsistent with federal policy? The few states to have considered this question
have held that they are not. See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125,
129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976); see also King v. Watertown, 195 Conn. 90, 486 A.2d 1111
(1985). An indemnification statute has even been borrowed for application in federal
court. See Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
299 See note 294 supra.
200 Accord S. STSINGLASS, supra note 4, at 12-7.
"01 Given that counsel is not always easy to obtain in section 1983 actions, I would,
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the goals of section 1983.
Other disparities between federal and state court, such as
issues concerning the scope and nature of the right to a jury
trial,30 2 and class action rules, must also be examined carefully.
If a procedure cannot be characterized as advantaging or dis-
advantaging plaintiffs, outside the context of a particular case,
the state should not be prohibited from using its own neutral
rules. If a rule might be thought to be disadvantageous to plain-
tiffs, that does not end the inquiry into whether the state may
be permitted to use its own procedure, but is the beginning of a
process of analysis and balancing.
My balance of the relevant interests maintains a presump-
tion in favor of state court procedures, plaintiff-oriented or not,
that is overcome only if the procedure is inherently hostile to
section 1983 plaintiffs. The result of this approach would lead to
less uniformity between federal and state court, or among state
courts, than would Professor Neuborne's position. I do not find
this result troubling. Uniformity trims the good as well as the
bad. While the availability of a federal forum does not give the
state courts license to eviscerate the remedies of section 1983, it
is, as Hart argued, relevant when debatable questions concern-
on the other hand, favor compelling the state courts to adopt the federal courts' forgiving
attitude to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
(pro se pleadings to be liberally construed).
32 In Dice, as discussed previously, the Court was willing to apply federal law to the
allocation of function between judge and jury, on the theory that the jury trial was an
integral part of the rights conferred by the FELA. See text accompanying notes 196-99
supra. In section 1983 actions, the subject matter varies enormously. Some claims, such
as the tort-like claim of police brutality or prisoners' deprivation of medical treatment,
would be tried before a jury under most states' laws; others, like the tax claims McNary
remits to the state courts, might not. See Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners & Taxpayers,
Inc. v. Kootenai Co., 104 Idaho 590, 661 P.2d 756 (1983) (no jury trial right in tax cases).
If a section 1983 claim would be tried before a jury in federal court, whether because of
the seventh amendment, see note 231 supra, which is not applicable in state court, or
because of federal statutory law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1954) & 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(1948), is a plaintiff entitled to a jury trial in state court? If there is a jury trial, should
federal law control issues such as the allocation of decision-making responsibilities be-
tween judge and jury, or whether a jury may be nonunanimous? In the FELA cases,
provision of a jury trial was held to be an essential part of the rights Congress was con-
ferring, see text accompanying notes 196-99 supra. The role of the jury in Congress's
design for section 1983 is more debatable. For a discussion of the legislative history on
this point, see S. STEINGLASS, supra note 4, at 14-3-5. (concluding that Congress would
have wished jury trials to be available in section 1983 actions). Again, the results of the
FELA cases do not necessarily apply. Independent statutory analysis and balancing of
the interests involved is necessary.
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ing the applicability of state collateral law arise.
The state courts and legislatures have the power to mini-
mize any disparities in justiciability or procedure between state
and federal court. The ideal result would be for the state courts
or legislatures to maintain a posture at least as generous as the
federal courts, particularly with regard to justiciability doctrine.
But when the states find a neutral but restrictive procedure im-
portant enough to force the issue, in many cases the Supreme
Court should permit the state courts their choice in exchange for
those instances in which the states' choice will favor civil rights
plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined statutes, case law, and principles
relevant to the question of when state courts should or must ap-
ply federal collateral law in section 1983 actions. I have not at-
tempted to answer all possible questions, but to explore how de-
cisions should be made.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the value of federal/
state court uniformity of procedure, apparently on the dual as-
sumptions that civil rights plaintiffs will benefit from a heavy
imposition of federal collateral law and that parity is a good in
itself. But federal law is not always superior, and parity does not
always consist of identity; it is a form of parity if state and fed-
eral court each offers its own advantages and disadvantages.
The missing piece of the puzzle is congressional intent.
Should Congress legislate to answer some of these questions? I
doubt that legislation on choice of law would be very helpful.
Congress could clarify that an inconsistency principle such as
that embodied in section 1988 should apply to choice of law
analysis in state as well as federal court, or take a position on
the relative merits of the Hart and the Neuborne positions. As
my own discussion probably demonstrates, formulating rules in
this area is only slightly less difficult than applying them. No
matter what Congress does, vexing individual decisions will have
to be confronted.
This Article has identified other important and useful jobs
for Congress to do. First, Congress should amend the removal
statutes to give civil rights plaintiffs the same final choice of fo-
rum that FELA and antitrust plaintiffs enjoy. There is simply
no good reason for allowing state defendants the power to re-
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move state court civil rights actions to federal court. The acci-
dent of law allowing them to do so seriously impedes the civil
rights plaintiff's ability to control not only the choice of forum,
but also the course of litigation. If state court procedures are
favorable enough to attract plaintiffs to what for institutional
reasons should be the preferred forum, those same procedures
are likely to repel defendants, who will remove to federal court.
Despite their efforts to be generous to civil rights plaintiffs, the
state courts nevertheless will have to cede a primary role in civil
rights litigation to the federal courts as long as defendants hold
the ultimate choice of forum.
Congress also has work to do in ensuring that the federal
forum for section 1983 actions is itself fair. Too many Supreme
Court decisions cutting holes in section 1983 jurisdiction have
gone unquestioned. It is difficult to justify using the supremacy
clause to compel the state courts to give up an accustomed pro-
cedure in entertaining a case Congress permits the federal courts
to reject. If Congress were to provide a truly fair and receptive
forum for civil rights litigation in federal court, plaintiffs would
have a meaningful choice of forum.
Even without congressional action, the state courts have
enormous power to further the goals of section 1983 and to avoid
painful litigation over the extent of federal power. The state
courts may simply agree not to use state procedures that ad-
versely affect civil rights plaintiffs. Whether the removal statute
is amended or not, the state courts could develop procedures
that would enhance their role in civil rights litigation. The state
courts are beginning to see the advantages of being the primary
forum for litigation against state officials. If the state courts, the
problem that caused the creation of section 1983, were to be-
come the better forum for vindicating the rights section 1983
protects, what a wonderful irony it would be.
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